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THE FATAL FAILURE OF THE REGULATORY STATE
W. KIP VISCUSI*
ABSTRACT
Although regulatory agencies place high values on the benefits
associated with the reduction in mortality risks due to regulations,
these same agencies substantially undervalue lives in their enforce-
ment efforts. The disparity between the valuation of prospective risks
and fatalities that have occurred is often by several orders of mag-
nitude, diminishing whatever safety incentives the regulations might
have generated. A review of the practices by the major federal agen-
cies with responsibility for product safety and occupational safety
finds that the value placed on fatalities in agencies’ regulatory an-
alyses can be a factor of 1000 times greater than the magnitude of the
corresponding sanctions that the agency levies for regulatory vi-
olations that led to the fatalities. The source of the mismatch between
the valuation of prospective risks and fatalities that have occurred
can be traced to agencies’ dated and restrictive legislative mandates.
This Article proposes revisions in these statutes to create more
appropriate, stronger safety incentives. Setting the pertinent price to
deter excessive risks will also foster corporate risk analyses so long
as companies are also provided with pertinent legal protections.
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Vanderbilt
Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, Tennessee 37203. kip.viscusi@vanderbilt.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of government policies depends on their design, im-
plementation, and enforcement.1 The administrative law literature
focuses primarily on matters of regulatory structure.2 Government
agencies entrusted with protection of the environment and pro-
motion of health and safety foster these objectives by designing
and promulgating regulations that are sometimes quite stringent.3
Whether these regulations will in fact generate their intended ef-
fects depends on whether they create sufficient economic incen-
tives to discourage risky behavior.
In a noteworthy 2016 incident, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration proposed a fine of $411,540 on the Cooper-
ative Producers Inc. Hayland facility after an elevator supervisor
suffocated when his lifeline became tangled in an unguarded, rota-
ting augur.4 The agency levied these penalty levels, which were
higher than the typical job safety violation penalty, because the
company was a repeat offender, having been cited six times for safe-
ty violations from 2011 to 2015.5 In the 2016 post-fatality inspection,
the agency foundCooperative Producers Inc. Hayland Facility guilty
of three egregious willful violations and three serious violations.6
Are fines of this magnitude appropriate for regulatory violations
leading to fatalities and, more generally, what should be the reg-
ulatory function of financial sanctions when lives are at risk? This
Article demonstrates a mismatch between the level of stringency of
regulatory design and regulatory enforcement for federal risk and
1. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & DAVID E. M. SAPPINGTON,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 9 (5th ed. 2018) (describing the increasing role
of courts in implementing and enforcing laws).
2. See, e.g., LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE STATE: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 24-27 tbl.5 (1993) (listing dozens of select health and safety regulations from the
federal government’s fiscal year 1992 budget).
4. Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., OSHA Cites Cooperative Pro-
ducer's Hayland Facility After Investigation of Elevator Superintendent's Death in Soybean
Bin (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region7/09122016 [https://
perma.cc/UD3Z-JXLE].
5. Id.
6. Id.
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environmental regulatory agencies. The gaps that are identified do
not involve subtle distinctions, as the stringency of regulatory stan-
dards often dwarfs that of enforcement efforts.
The economic benefits associated with the reduction of mortality
risks constitute the largest component of all regulatory benefits for
federal regulations.7 The principal framework used in assessing the
value of the reduction of mortality risk is based on the risk-money
tradeoff for very small risks, or what has come to be known as the
“value of a statistical life,” or the VSL.8 The values currently used
by many government agencies to value each expected fatality pre-
vented are in the vicinity of $9 million or more.9 Although the VSL
establishes a substantial price for expected fatalities resulting from
different risks, this price pertains to the risks assessed prospective-
ly by regulatory agencies.10 In situations in which companies vio-
late the regulations in a manner that leads to worker or consumer
deaths, the price attached to lives is often quite low.11 In this Art-
icle, the VSL serves as the appropriate deterrence-based estimate
of the value that should be placed on fatalities in agency enforce-
ment efforts.12 This Article documents the mismatch in the valua-
tions and proposes statutory changes to address the imbalance.
7. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2015
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 13 (2015), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9KC-BNXU].
8. See W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY 11-13 (2018);
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 51 (2014).
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR REGULATORY IMPACT AN-
ALYSIS 15 (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/242926/HHS_RIAGuidance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6PR2-VBK4]; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE 2016:
TREATMENT OF THE VALUE OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSES 1 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2016%20
Revised%20Value%20of%20a%20Statistical%20Life%20Guidance.pdf [https: //perma.cc/
G8DM-WG38]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR
POLICY: A META-ANALYTIC APPROACH 2 (2016), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/
0CA9E925C9A702F285257F380050C842/$File/VSL%20white%20paper_final_020516.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NJX-B9ZU]; W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Individual and Societal Risks to
Life and Health, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 385, 436-41
tbls.7.2 & 7.3 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/handbooks/22117547 [https://perma.cc/Z94Y-RYBJ].
10. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 11-13.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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The Article begins by documenting the low values currently
placed on life in regulatory enforcement efforts. Part I presents ex-
amples involving job safety, food safety, motor-vehicle safety, and
environmental quality, which demonstrate that the assignment of
low values to fatalities is not an infrequent practice. Why such low
values are problematic is the focus of Part II, which outlines the
practices used in regulatory impact analyses for prospective reg-
ulations and the principles for optimal deterrence. To implement
these principles requires changing the current statutory guidance,
as the agencies currently are hamstrung by very low caps on al-
lowable penalties.13 Part III presents the proposed revisions of sev-
eral representative statutes pertaining to health, safety, and the
environment. Once firms begin to face meaningful enforcement
sanctions, this enhanced penalty structure will alter their calcula-
tion of the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance. As Part IV
indicates, establishing penalty levels consistent with law and
economic theories of optimal deterrence also will influence the
corporate risk analyses used in determining appropriate levels of
safety. But realizing the full potential of such changes will require
that companies be provided with legal protections for undertaking
analyses that balance the competing economic concerns of costs
and risks. The concluding discussion summarizes the rationale for
rectifying the mismatch between regulatory design and regulatory
enforcement.
I. AGENCY PENALTIES FOR FATALITIES
To examine the disparity between the optimal deterrence
amounts and the penalties levied for regulatory violations, this Part
examines the determination of the penalty levels for four govern-
ment agencies concerned with the promotion of worker safety, prod-
uct safety, and environmental safety. Common themes exist in the
analysis of the job safety violation penalties levied by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),14 the food safety
violation penalties levied by the Food and Drug Administration
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I.A.
594 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:589
(FDA),15 the motor-vehicle safety violation penalties levied by the
Department of Transportation (DOT),16 and the environmental vio-
lation penalties levied by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).17 The statutory guidance for each of these agencies estab-
lishes the permissible penalty structures and, in particular, the up-
per limit on the penalties that are permitted.18 As this review will
indicate, the penalty amounts fall far short of what would be ade-
quate from the standpoint of generating incentives for optimal levels
of deterrence.19
A. Occupational Safety and Health Administration: Worker
Fatalities
The very modest level of penalties that federal regulatory agen-
cies assess for fatal regulatory violations is exemplified by the per-
formance of OSHA. OSHA’s regulatory approach is to set health and
safety standards, to inspect firms to ascertain whether they are in
violation of the standards, and to assess penalties for standards vio-
lations that are identified in these inspections.20 Many of these
standards pertain to traumatic injuries, which means there are no
latency periods or problems in inferring the work-related causality
as there would be for illnesses such as cancer.21 As a result, OSHA
serves as an excellent starting point for considering how and at
what level penalties are assessed for regulatory violations involving
deaths.22 As this Article will demonstrate for other federal agencies
as well,23 the statutory structure of the penalties that OSHA is per-
mitted to levy constrains the amount of fines that the agency can
impose for regulatory violations, leading to inadequate incentives
for safety.24
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See infra Part I.D.
18. See infra notes 27, 31, 33-35, 81, 104-05, 106-07, 135-41, and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., infra Part I.A.
20. See W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 16 (1983).
21. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 29.
22. See id.
23. See infra Parts I.B-D.
24. See infra notes 27-35.
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OSHA has several classifications for the level of violations. Those
violations that are most directly pertinent to the prevention of
fatality risks are classified as “serious” violations.25 “A serious vio-
lation exists when the workplace hazard could cause an accident or
illness that would most likely result in death or serious physical
harm, unless the employer did not know or could not have known
of the violation.”26
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established a
cap of $1000 for each such serious violation, which was later raised
to $7000.27 There was no apparent underlying methodological basis
for setting that level, such as reliance on an economic deterrence
measure such as the VSL28 or even the value of compensation in
wrongful death cases, which addresses the financial losses after a
fatality rather than the value of preventing the risk of death.29 Each
of these measures would have led to considerably greater penalty
levels.30 During the almost half a century after the establishment
of the initial penalty levels, the upper limit on penalties has been
updated somewhat for inflation but not otherwise revamped so that
the maximum allowable penalty per serious violation has risen to
$12,934 per violation in 2018.31 Even this inflation update is in-
adequate, as the consumer price index increased by a factor of more
than six since the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970.32 Therefore, a penalty level of at least $42,000 per
25. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FEDERAL EMPLOYER
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING AN OSHA INSPECTION—1996 (1996), https://www.
osha.gov/Publications/fedrites.html [https://perma.cc/LLR7-GBSK] [hereinafter Federal Em-
ployer Rights].
26. Id.
27. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970), with 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2012).
28. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, On Balance: Don’t Undervalue Life, SOC’Y FOR BENEFIT-COST AN-
ALYSIS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://benefitcostanalysis.org/balance-dont-undervalue-life [https://
perma.cc/TBG5-UQQ2].
29. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 538-
39 (2005).
30. Cf. id. at 537-39; Viscusi, supra note 28.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3) (2018); OSHA Penalties, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., (2018), https://www.osha.gov/penalties/ [https://perma.cc/D5M3-
Y2HP] [hereinafter OSHA Penalties].
32. Based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator, the purchasing power of
$1 in December 1970 would require $6.23 in January 2018 to have the same purchasing
power. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. & STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/G6QF-U2DQ] (type “1.00” in the search bar; then
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serious violation would be warranted. Violations that are charac-
terized as “[o]ther-than-seriou[s],” violations related to posting re-
quirements for notices from OSHA, and violations associated with
a failure to abate a violation, also are subject to the same maxi-
mum amounts per violation.33 Violations that are willful or repeated
and which reflect indifference to employee safety were subject to a
statutory cap of $70,00034 that has since been updated to $129,336
per violation as of January 3, 2018.35
OSHA enforcement efforts consist of inspecting workplaces, iden-
tifying violations of pertinent safety standards, and assessing
penalties for these violations within statutory limits on financial
sanctions.36 The enforcement efforts vary, as in some cases the en-
forcement efforts are implemented through federal enforcement
actions, whereas in other situations the states have undertaken
the role of enforcing OSHA’s regulatory standards.37 However, the
penalty levels levied on firms for workplace fatalities are inade-
quate from a deterrence standpoint in each of these instances. The
median penalty that was assessed in Fiscal Year 2016 for violations
associated with the death of a worker was $6500 for federally op-
erated OSHA efforts and $2500 for state plans.38 Thus, even though
the regulatory violation was associated with a workplace fatality,
the median penalty amount is even below the quite modest statu-
tory cap for a single serious violation.39
Consideration of the largest penalties ever levied in the history
of the agency indicates a low penalty level associated with all regu-
latory violations that are identified at firms experiencing worker
fatalities. Nine of the top ten penalties ever levied by OSHA were
select “December,” “1970,” “January,” and “2018” respectively in the drop-down menus; then
click “Calculate”).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(c)-(d), (i) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(4)-(6); see also OSHA Pen-
alties, supra note 31.
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(1); see also OSHA Penalties, supra note 31.
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA AT-A-
GLANCE, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/3439at-a-glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF2W-
TBZY].
37. See id.
38. AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB, THE TOLL OF NEGLECT: A NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE
PROFILE OF WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 141 (26th ed. 2017).
39. Compare id., with 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), and 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3).
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for regulatory violations at firms where there had been a recent
worker fatality.40 These penalty amounts for the entire set of reg-
ulatory violations considered in each instance range from $6.6
million to $81.3 million.41 However, the size of the penalty amount
per worker death is fairly low even if one assumes that the entire
penalty is for the fatality-related regulatory infractions, rather
than possibly hundreds of other regulatory violations discovered
as part of the OSHA inspection following the deaths.
The two largest penalties ever levied by OSHA were against the
BP Texas City Refinery in 2005 and 2009.42 These penalties were
linked to a single workplace event and the company’s subsequent
failure to undertake abatement actions to address the risks.43 The
second largest penalty levied in OSHA’s history was for the March
23, 2005, explosion and fire in the Isomerization Unit of the BP
Texas Oil Refinery in Texas City, Texas.44 This explosion led to
the deaths of 15 contractor employees as well as injuries to at least
170 other BP employees and contractor employees.45 Following the
health and safety inspection, OSHA levied a penalty of $21.4 mil-
lion, which was the largest penalty that OSHA had issued up to that
time and remains the second largest penalty in OSHA history.46
Excluding any role of the penalties to address the valuations of
worker injuries or regulatory violations other than those specifi-
cally related to the fatalities, the average penalty imposed per
worker fatality was only $1.4 million.47 As part of the 2005 set-
tlement agreement for this explosion, BP agreed to undertake a se-
ries of abatement actions and to implement by 2009 all feasible
40. See Top Enforcement Cases Based on Total Issued Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (2018), https://www.osha.gov/dep/enforcement/
top_cases. html [https://perma.cc/V8ZQ-B2E4] [hereinafter Top Enforcement Cases]; infra
notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
41. See Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
42. See id.
43. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FACT SHEET ON
HISTORY OF 2012 AGREEMENT BETWEEN OSHA AND BP, https://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/Fact
Sheet-BP-2012- Agreement.html [https://perma.cc/YP4X-6PMD] [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
44. See BP Texas City Violations and Settlement Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OC-
CUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/bp.html [https://perma.cc/
MGG2-WPWJ] [hereinafter BP Texas City Violations]; Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
45. See FACT SHEET, supra note 43. 
46. See id.; Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
47. See generally FACT SHEET, supra note 43.
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recommendations that OSHA made as a consequence of the inspec-
tion.48
Subsequent to this incident, the workforce at this BP facility con-
tinued to be exposed to serious risks.49 One contractor was killed in
2006 after being crushed between a scissor lift and a pipe rack;
another employee of a contractor was electrocuted in 2007; and in
2008, a BP employee and a contractor were killed in separate in-
cidents.50 Whereas these fatalities were indicative of the continued
lax safety at the BP facility, it was a related series of regulatory
violations that triggered what remains the largest penalty ever
levied by OSHA.51 The 2009 OSHA inspection that followed one
month after the deadline that BP had been given for completing its
abatement efforts concluded that BP had failed to correct 270 in-
stances of violations that it was supposed to abate as a result of
the agreement reached after the 2005 incident, leading to a penal-
ty of $50.6 million.52 In addition, OSHA levied a penalty of $30.7
million for 439 additional willful violations, but this penalty amount
was reduced to $13 million based on a negotiated agreement
between BP and OSHA.53 The 2009 BP penalties are the largest
penalties ever assessed by OSHA.54
If one combines the value of the penalties that BP paid for the
2005 and 2009 enforcement actions, which rank as the top two
penalties levied in the history of the agency, and if one assumes that
the pertinent VSL is about $10 million,55 then the total penalty
amount of $85 million is far less than the economically efficient de-
terrence amount, based on the magnitude of the adverse health
risks and ignoring the role of penalties for the hundreds of willful
and repeated violations. The appropriate deterrence amount for the
fifteen initial deaths alone merits penalties that exceed the com-
bined 2005 and 2009 penalty.56 Additional penalties beyond those
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.; BP Texas City Violations, supra note 44.
52. See FACT SHEET, supra note 43.
53. See id.
54. See BP Texas City Violations, supra note 44.
55. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 28; infra text accompanying notes 228-29.
56. Assuming a VSL of $10 million, the appropriate deterence amount for fifteen deaths
would be $150 million.
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pertaining to the fatalities are warranted for the continued injur-
ies, hundreds of repeated violations, and hundreds of new regula-
tory violations.
The other seven most prominent penalty amounts that OSHA has
levied follow similar orders of magnitude.57 The fire and series of ex-
plosions at the IMC Fertilizer/Angus Chemical Plant in Sterlington,
Louisiana, led to eight deaths and forty-two worker injuries,58 and
OSHA levied penalties of $11.6 million on IMC Fertilizer/Angus
Chemical.59 The 2008 sugar refinery explosion in Georgia at Im-
perial Sugar occurred after knee-high combustible sugar dust ex-
ploded, killing fourteen workers and causing additional injuries.60
The OSHA penalty amount of $8.8 million, for infractions that
OSHA mostly characterized as being willful violations, was ulti-
mately settled for $6 million, or a penalty of approximately $429,000
per death.61 The fifth and tenth largest penalties arose from a single
incident: a construction-related explosion at the Kleen Energy Sys-
tems Natural Gas Power Plant.62 The pressurized natural gas that
was being used to blow debris out of pipes led to an explosion that
killed six workers and injured fifty other workers.63 OSHA deter-
mined that the two subcontractors and fourteen other companies
were guilty of hundreds of safety violations.64 The largest penalties
were $8.3 million for O&G Industries, Inc., and nearly $6.7 million
for Keystone Construction Maintenance.65 For the three other top
ten ranked OSHA penalties involving fatalities, OSHA levied $8.3
million in penalties on Samsung Guam, Inc., for 118 violations
57. See Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
58. OSHA’s First $10 Million Fine, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Dec. 1991, at 13, 13-14.
59. See Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
60. See Larry Peterson, Imperial Sugar Settles for $6 Million, Admits No Wrongdoing,
SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (July 8, 2010, 12:18 AM), http://savannahnow.com/news/2010-07-
08/imperial-sugar-settles-6-million-admits-no-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/JA3W-DWPW].
61. See Julia Muller, TIMELINE: Imperial Sugar Explosion from 2008 Until Today,
SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Feb. 10, 2013, 8:20 AM), http://www.savannahnow.com/news/
2013-02-10/timeline-imperial-sugar-explosion-2008-until-today [https://perma.cc/FVS6-DS98].
62. See Dave Altimari & Matthew Kauffman, 5 Years After Kleen Energy Blast, ‘Main
Actor’ Pays Fraction of $6.7 Million Fine, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 9, 2015, 9:56 AM), http://
www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-kleen-energy-fine-20150206-story.html [https://perma.
cc/4S4A-9F2E]; Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
63. Altimari & Kauffman, supra note 62.
64. Id.
65. Id.
600 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:589
associated with one worker death; 66 $8.2 million in penalties against
CITGO Petroleum for violations that were settled for $5.8 million
for an explosion that killed six workers;67 and $7.5 million in pen-
alties for Dayton Tire for approximately one hundred willful vio-
lations identified by an inspection after one worker death.68 The
penalty amounts for all other OSHA penalty situations rank below
these values.69
Whether considering the median penalty amounts for violations
related to killing a worker or the entire set of penalties arising in
situations after a worker fatality, the financial incentives for safety
fall short of what they should be to establish appropriate levels of
deterrence.70 In the case of OSHA, the statutory limits on the pen-
alty levels are unrelated to the VSL or any other meaningful deter-
rence concept, leading to penalties after fatalities that fall short of
the desirable level.71 This shortfall in penalty levels is not unique to
OSHA, as the subsequent consideration of other federal agencies
indicates.72
B. Food and Drug Administration: Food Safety
As was the case with OSHA, the FDA has caps on the penalties
that can be levied.73 The FDA has an enforcement strategy different
than that of OSHA as it does not impose fatality-related penalties
as a result of either workplace inspections or product inspections.74
Rather, the fatality-related penalties arise from conduct that is in
66. See Inspection: 106196801—Samsung Guam Inc., U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=106196801
[https://perma.cc/3JPP-ABKM].
67. See Karen Ball, Citgo Petroleum to Pay $5.8 Million for Deadly Louisiana Blast,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 29, 1991), https://www.apnews.com/c5d019f5fedfb640ee620df96641
79bb [https://perma.cc/BM5R-Q6DR].
68. See Inspection: 109061648: Dayton Tire Company, U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha/gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=109061648
[https://perma.cc/4GBD-QQ3Z].
69. Top Enforcement Cases, supra note 40.
70. See, e.g., supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Parts I.B-D.
73. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
74. Cf. What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWe
Do/default.htm [https://perma.cc/FWX3-38BA].
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violation of FDA regulations, including behavior that sometimes
results in consumer deaths, which may also trigger FDA investiga-
tions of the causes of the death.75 The caps on the allowable pen-
alties vary by regulatory area because the agency has a wide range
of responsibilities such as those pertaining to prescription drugs,
medical devices, adulterated food, and standards for clinical trials.76
Consequently, there are dozens of civil monetary penalty authorities
that are administered by the FDA.77 In some instances, it is difficult
for an outside observer to ascertain any specific linkage of penalties
to the product fatalities because the agency may have levied pen-
alties for a broad series of regulatory violations. For example, in the
case of the painkiller Vioxx, which created substantial heart risks,
Merck paid the FDA $950 million for illegally introducing a drug
into interstate commerce and for promoting a drug for a use that
had not yet been approved by the FDA.78 Separately, Merck also
settled 27,000 lawsuits by patients and their families.79
For concreteness, the examples below focus on enforcement ef-
forts with respect to food safety as these case studies are associated
with incidents that generated well-defined acute deaths from expo-
sure to hazardous food. Thus, the relation between the penalties
and the number of deaths will be more clear-cut than for products
that pose more deferred risks, such as deaths from heart attacks, for
which the extent of the risk increase and the number of deaths spe-
cifically attributable to the product may not be known.80 As of 2017,
the FDA provisions pertaining to adulterated food imposed a cap of
$76,352 for any individual introducing adulterated food into inter-
state commerce, with a limit of $763,515 for all violations adju-
dicated in a single proceeding.81
75. Cf. id.
76. See id.
77. See 21 C.F.R. § 17.1 (2018).
78. See Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950 Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxx-
case.html [https://perma.cc/D4SM-A53Q]; see also Rick Valliere, Merck Agrees to Pay $950
Million to Resolve Vioxx Promotion Cases, 39 BLOOMBERG L: PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1309
(Dec. 5, 2011).
79. See Wilson, supra note 78.
80. Cf. VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 29; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 17.2 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 102.3 (2017).
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A 2011 tainted food product incident involving a cantaloupe farm
in Colorado led to at least 33 deaths, 147 hospitalizations, a miscar-
riage, and possibly 10 additional deaths.82 The genesis of this food
safety problem was that Eric Jensen and Ryan Jensen, who oper-
ated a cantaloupe farm in Granada, Colorado, allegedly changed
their process that was used to clean the cantaloupe in order to pre-
vent contamination by harmful bacteria.83 The farm failed to use
chlorine spray to reduce the bacterial risks and also kept the can-
taloupe in unsanitary conditions, leading to contamination of the
cantaloupes with Listeria monocytogenes and the aforementioned
adverse health impacts.84 After pleading guilty to misdemeanor
counts of introducing adulterated food into interstate commerce,
these two farmers were required to pay $150,000 each in restitution,
devote one hundred hours to community service, and serve six
months of home detention and five years of probation.85 The optimal
deterrence amount based on the VSL for even a single fatality ex-
ceeded the monetary value of the regulatory sanctions that the FDA
imposed.86
More severe sanctions resulted after the E. coli outbreak result-
ing from the contamination of Odwalla Inc. apple juice.87 This in-
cident led to the death of a sixteen-month-old baby and illnesses af-
fecting at least sixty-six other people.88 The U.S. Department of
82. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dist. of Colo., Eric and Ryan Jensen Plead
Guilty to All Counts of Introducing Tainted Cantaloupe into Interstate Commerce (Oct. 22,
2013), https://www.justice/gov/usao-co/pr/eric-and-ryan-jensen-plead-guilty-all-countys-
introducting-tainted-tantaloupe-interstate [https://perma.cc/D9LX-CZ9V] [hereinafter Colo.
Press Release]; see also Mary Beth Marklein, Cantaloupe Farmers Get No Prison Time in
Disease Outbreak, USA TODAY (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2014/01/28/sentencing-of-colorado-cantaloupe-farmers/4958671/ [https://perma.
cc/G3CE-VMYT]. 
83. See Colo. Press Release, supra note 82.
84. See id.
85. See Ray Sanchez, At Sentencing, Cantaloupe Growers Apologize for Deadly Listeria
Outbreak, CNN (Feb. 4, 2014, 5:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/28/justice/cantaloupe-
listeria-deaths-sentencing/index.html [https://perma.cc/629A-JPRB]. 
86. Assuming a VSL of $10 million and also assuming that the VSL is the efficient
deterrence amount, the combined monetary value of these sanctions likely would be below $10
million for reasonable economic measures of the value of time and the inconvenience of
detention and probation.
87. See Odwalla Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY (July 23, 1998, 4:41 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/1998/07/23/companies/odwalla/ [https://perma.cc/38WP-2P3J].
88. See Juice Maker Fined Record $1.5 Million for Sales of Contaminated Apple Juice, 26
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Justice sought criminal sanctions on behalf of the FDA for the adul-
terated food violation, leading to what was at that time the largest
penalty that the FDA had ever levied in a criminal case involving
food injuries.89 The total penalty amount was $1.5 million, of which
$250,000 took the form of contributions to a charitable organization
and two food safety research centers.90 As in the case of the canta-
loupe contamination, the financial sanctions were seriously inade-
quate from the standpoint of optimal deterrence.91
The FDA levied smaller sanctions per fatality in a 2001 meat
contamination case involving the Sara Lee Corporation.92 After lis-
teria contamination of hot dogs and cold cuts led to an estimated
fifteen deaths and dozens of illnesses, the FDA sought misdemean-
or charges against Sara Lee Corporation.93 In addition to under-
taking a national recall of the tainted meat, Sara Lee Corporation
paid $4.4 million in penalties, which has an average value of under
$300,000 per death, excluding any role for penalties other than the
sanction per fatality, such as the illnesses or other regulatory viola-
tions.94
The most extreme sanctions ever levied in a food safety case in-
volved criminal sentences for two former officials of the Peanut
Corporation of America (PCA).95 The Salmonella-tainted peanut
butter from PCA led to 9 deaths and 22,000 illnesses.96 In addition
to charges relating to sales of contaminated food, the company was
charged with wire fraud as well as fraud for claiming that peanuts
BLOOMBERG L.: PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 722 (1998) [hereinafter Juice Maker Fined].
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92. See Helen V. Cantwell et al., Food for Thought: Corporate Executives on Notice That
DOJ Will Seek to Hold Them Criminally Liable for Contaminated Food Outbreaks and
Product Failures, 42 BLOOMBERG L.: PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1377, 1378 (2014).
93. See David Barboza, Sara Lee Corp. Pleads Guilty in Meat Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/23/us/sara-lee-corp-pleads-guilty-in-meat-case.html
[https://perma.cc/AW9Q-QDPE].
94. See id.
95. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Peanut Company President Receives
Largest Criminal Sentence in Food Safety Case; Two Others Also Sentenced in Their Roles
in Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Product Outbreak (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/former-peanut-company-president-receives-largest-criminal-sentence-food-safety-case-
two [https://perma.cc/X9TP-C2LW] [hereinafter Former Peanut Company]; see also Cantwell
et al., supra note 92, at 1377.
96. See Former Peanut Company, supra note 95.
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grown in Mexico were from the United States and for misrepresent-
ing where the peanuts had been processed.97 There has been no
attempt by the U.S. Department of Justice to obtain a financial pen-
alty from PCA, presumably because PCA had filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy shortly after the peanut butter recall.98 However, the
former owner and president of the company received a prison term
of 336 months, the business partner was sentenced to 240 months
in prison, and a third official received a 60-month sentence.99
With the exception of the PCA criminal sanctions, the penalties
have been relatively modest for companies that have marketed dan-
gerous food products resulting in fatalities. The PCA situation was
distinctive in that, since the company filed for bankruptcy shortly
after the peanut butter recall, there would be little role for financial
penalties.100 In addition, the diversity of the violations which ex-
tended beyond only introducing adulterated food products, also
distinguished the situation so that criminal sanctions of this type
remain the exception rather than the norm for FDA violations.101
C. Department of Transportation: Motor-Vehicle Safety
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has responsibility for promulgating standards and enforcing reg-
ulations relating to motor-vehicle safety.102 As in the case of OSHA
and the FDA, the pertinent statute, the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, establishes limits on the amount of penalties
that can be levied for violations.103 The maximum penalty for a vio-
lation was originally set at $5000,104 which was also the maximum
OSHA penalty level for serious violations, but the NHTSA maxi-
mum penalty level has since been increased to $21,000.105 Similarly,
97. See Cantwell et al., supra note 92, at 1378-79.
98. See Jane Zhang, Peanut Corp. Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2009, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123455479448785081 [https://perma.cc/8TCJ-EXAK].
99. See Former Peanut Company, supra note 95.
100. Cf. Zhang, supra note 98.
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102. See About, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT ’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://
www.nhtsa.gov/about-nhtsa [https://perma.cc/W74C-PCUX].
103. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (2012), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
105. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
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the maximum penalty for a related series of violations was formerly
$35 million,106 but was increased to $105 million in 2016.107 In each
instance, there is no apparent methodological foundation for the
maximum penalty level other than some adjustments to reflect the
impact of inflation.108
The General Motors (GM) ignition switch recall regulatory expe-
rience provides a valuable case study of how these financial limits
influence the penalties that can be imposed and the relation of these
penalties to the sanctions that would be merited from the stand-
point of efficient levels of deterrence.109 Although penalty caps have
since been updated, at the time of the NHTSA action pertaining to
the GM ignition switch recall, the statutory cap on permissible
damages was $5000 for each violation and $35 million for a related
series of violations.110 By imposing the maximum permissible pen-
alty amount of $35 million on GM, NHTSA levied the largest pen-
alty that it had issued for delays in reporting defects that related to
a safety recall.111 While the maximum penalty amounts have since
been raised to $105 million as part of the recent update in regula-
tory penalty levels,112 the discussion below will focus on the reg-
ulatory regime in place that was pertinent to GM.113 Note that the
permissible penalty levels continue to be dwarfed by the appropriate
deterrence-based values even after accounting for the penalty
updates.114
NHTSA levied the penalty of $35 million on GM in 2014 because
GM had failed to report the ignition switch failure to the agency.115
106. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. I 2014), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV
2017).
107. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
108. Cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
110. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. 2013), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV
2017).
111. See Jeff Plungis & Tim Higgins, GM to Pay Record $35M Fine Over Ignition-Switch
Recall, 42 BLOOMBERG L.: PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 534, 534 (2014).
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. I 2014), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp.
IV 2017).
114. Cf. supra note 86.
115. See Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Con-
sent Order ¶¶ 5, 10-11 (May 16, 2014), www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/communications/pdf/May-
16-2014-TQ14-001-Consent-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/9URK-D24L] [hereinafter Consent
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Because the switch was designed with too low torque, it could move
from the “run” position to the “off” position, causing a loss in power,
which in turn resulted in a loss in power steering, loss of power
breaks, and loss of function in the frontal airbags.116 GM was aware
of the defect; one GM engineer involved in trying to rectify the prob-
lem referred to it as “the switch from hell.”117 The adverse safety
consequences of the ignition switch failure led to a series of acci-
dents, including 13 documented deaths at the time of the NHTSA
penalty, and an ultimate total of 124 deaths and 275 injuries.118
Property damage, including harm to the crashed vehicles, also re-
sulted from the product defect.119
Setting aside the costs of the accidents other than the fatalities,
the penalty amount that the NHTSA levied had an average value of
$2.7 million per fatality based on the early estimate of 13 fatalities
due to the defect.120 Based on the ultimate death toll of 124 deaths,
the penalty per fatality was $282,000.121 The cap on the total dam-
ages amount that could be imposed led to inadequate levels of deter-
rence.122 Note too that the procedure for calculating the penalties
related to the duration of time in which GM failed to report the de-
fect rather than the number of deaths, as the penalty amounts were
still capped at $5000 per violation.123 Thus, NHTSA did not con-
struct the penalties using a procedure based on an assessment of
Order]; see also Plungis & Higgins, supra note 111, at 534.
116. Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Anton R. Valukas, Esq.
et al., Jenner & Block LLP (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/772311/
download [https://perma.cc/PVJ3-2P5D] (Exhibits A and B).
117. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2016). 
118. See Kirsten Korosec, Ten Times More Deaths Linked to Faulty Switch than GM First
Reported, FORTUNE (Aug. 24, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/feinberg-gm-
faulty-ignition-switch/ [https://perma.cc/N5CB-WVF4] (noting that 124 deaths and 275 in-
juries had been linked to GM’s recalled ignition switches—far more than the 13 originally
reported by GM); see also ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL
MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014), http://www.beasleyallen.
com/webfiles/valukas-report-on-gm-redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FW5-RH5G] (noting that
“[m]ore than a dozen” fatalities had been documented by GM).
119. See VALUKAS, supra note 118, at 5-6.
120. The value of $35 million in penalties divided by 13 fatalities is $35,000,000/13, which
equals $2,692,308, or about $2.7 million.
121. The average penalty per death for 124 deaths is $35,000,000/124, which equals
$282,258, or about $282,000 per fatality.
122. See supra note 86.
123. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (2012), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
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the penalty level adequate to deter the behavior that led to the
number of fatalities, which it then could have multiplied by the
value assigned to each fatality. The statutory structure governs the
level at which penalties can be set and does not involve the assess-
ment of a monetary sanction per fatality.124
Today, even penalties that could be levied based on the updated
cap of $105 million would be inadequate for a product defect leading
to 124 deaths.125 If the GM case had been undertaken in a regime
governed by the new penalty structure, NHTSA could have easily
justified penalties equal to the higher total penalty cap since both
the penalty per violation and the maximum penalty for a series of
violations each tripled.126 Consequently, the same characterization
of infractions that led to a combined penalty of $35 million would
now lead to a value of $105 million given the tripling of the penalty
levels.127 Even with such an increase in sanctions, the average pen-
alty amount per fatality, excluding from consideration the number
of violations and the failure to report the defect, would only be
$847,000 per fatality, which is an order of magnitude below the
optimal deterrence level associated with the VSL.128
The underpricing of fatality risks is also apparent in the case of
the $1 billion settlement that NHTSA reached with Takata Cor-
poration for airbag-related defects.129 The defective design of Takata
airbags led to the explosion of the airbags and release of shrapnel
that has led to eleven deaths in the United States.130 The settlement
that was negotiated by the U.S. Department of Justice provided for
$975 million in restitution to the carmakers and those who suffered
losses due to the airbag, and a $25 million payment to the United
124. Cf. id.
125. For the current penalties, see 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
126. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (2012), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp.
IV 2017), with 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
127. See supra note 126.
128. Assuming a VSL of $10 million, the value of $10,000,000 divided by $847,000 equals
11.8, which exceeds the value of 10 for the discrepancy to be an order of magnitude difference.
129. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Jamie Butters, Takata to Pay $1 Billion in U.S. Air Bag
Probe; Execs Charged, 45 BLOOMBERG L.: PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 89, 89 (2017).
130. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
NHTSA Confirms 11th U.S. Fatality Tied to Rupture of Takata Air Bag Inflator (Oct. 20,
2016), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-confirms-11th-us-fatality-tied-rupture-
takata-air-bag-inflator [https://perma.cc/6M2W-ZUHU].
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States.131 This $25 million payment was not a fine per fatality, but
was the penalty for violations such as wire fraud as a result of pro-
viding misleading information to car manufacturers, consumers,
and regulators about the safety of the air bags.132 Setting aside all
of these rationales for penalties other than the fatalities, the av-
erage penalty per fatality that is reflected in the U.S. sanction is
$2.3 million.133 Thus, even if penalties were based solely on the
fatalities that occurred, and there was no constraint on setting pen-
alties linked to fatalities rather than to each separate violation as
specified in the statute, the penalty levels would be inadequate from
the standpoint of using the VSL to determine optimal levels of de-
terrence.134
D. Environmental Protection Agency: Air Pollution Emissions and
Pesticide Risk
The EPA administers several statutes, each of which have dif-
ferent provisions relating to penalties that can be assessed. For
example, the civil penalties that can be levied for emissions in
violation of the Clean Air Act are capped at $25,000 per day, with
a maximum penalty of $200,000.135 However, for criminal penalties
in the case of violations that are misdemeanors resulting in death,
the fines cannot be more than $250,000 for individuals136 and
$500,000 for organizations.137 Penalties for violations of the Clean
Water Act are subject to a daily limit of $25,000 per violation.138
Civil penalties under the Toxic Substances Control Act are limited
131. See Fisk & Butters, supra note 129, at 89. 
132. See id.
133. If we treat $25 million as the penalty related to the 11 fatalities, the penalty per fa-
tality is $25,000,000/11, which equals $2,272,727, or about $2.3 million per fatality.
134. See supra note 86.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2012) (“The Administrator’s authority under this paragraph
shall be limited to matters where the total penalty sought does not exceed $200,000 and the
first alleged date of violation occurred no more than 12 months prior to the initiation of the
administrative action, except where the Administrator and the Attorney General jointly de-
termine that a matter involving a larger penalty amount or longer period of violation is
appropriate for administrative penalty action. Any such determination by the Administrator
and the Attorney General shall not be subject to judicial review.”).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(4) (2012).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(4).
138. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012).
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to a penalty of $37,500 per day.139 These statutes also have provi-
sions for penalties relating to criminal violations for hazards posing
an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, such as the
Toxic Substances Control Act’s criminal penalty cap of $250,000 per
violation for an individual,140 and $1,000,000 per violation for an
organization.141
The penalties that are imposed within this structure are concep-
tually unrelated to the VSL or other meaningful deterrence concepts
and generally fall short of the levels that are needed to generate
optimal levels of deterrence.142 Let us begin with the penalties aris-
ing from the Clean Air Act violations associated with DuPont’s re-
lease of dangerous substances into the Kanawha River.143 The eight
releases of dangerous chemicals posed hazards to the Kanawha
River and affected populations, and the exposure to the toxic gas
phosgene led to one DuPont worker death.144 These activities
allegedly violated the Clean Air Act, the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.145 EPA assessed
$1.275 million in penalties against DuPont for violations associated
with one fatality as well as the associated environmental harms.146
Tyson Foods, Inc. also violated the Clean Air Act, including ac-
cidental chemical releases of anhydrous ammonia at facilities in
four states, leading to personal injuries, property damage, and one
fatality.147 The company had a continuing pattern of regulatory
139. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
140. Id. § 2615(b)(2)(A) (“Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision
of section 2614 or 2689 of this title, and who knows at the time of the violation that the vi-
olation places an individual in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall be
subject on conviction to a fine of not more than $250,000, or imprisonment for not more than
15 years, or both.”).
141. Id. § 2615(b)(2)(B).
142. Cf. supra notes 28, 108 and accompanying text.
143. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Settles with DuPont to Resolve
Clean Air Act Violations and Protect Communities and Kanawha River near West Virginia
Facility (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-settles-dupont-resolve-clean-air-act-
violations-and-protect-communities-and-kanawha-river [https://perma.cc/6VFK-B4AW]. 
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Tyson Foods, Inc. Clean Air Act (CAA)
Settlement (Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/tyson-foods-inc [https://perma.cc/
M2R5-QJD8].
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violations involving anhydrous ammonia releases.148 One release in
October 2006 led to one fatality and one injury.149 Another release
in November 2006 caused three onsite injuries and $125,000 in
property damage.150 A release in December 2006 caused ten injuries
as well as toxic air emissions.151 A subsequent release in December
2006 caused five on-site injuries and the evacuation of 475 employ-
ees.152 Emissions in October 2007 and November 2009 caused inju-
ries to the same employee in each instance.153 A different October
2007 release led to one injury as well as air releases of toxic am-
monia.154 A November 2009 incident burned over 25 percent of an
employee’s body, requiring 45 days of hospitalization.155 A December
2010 event led to both toxic air emissions as well as three injuries.156
Even if we exclude the rather extensive and continuing list of physi-
cal and environmental harms and focus solely on the single fatality,
the $3.95 million penalty that Tyson was required to pay falls short
of the optimal deterrence amount.157 Moreover, the continued pat-
tern of serious injuries related to toxic emissions suggests that
whatever impact the sanctions have had has been insufficient to
lead to an adequate level of safety.
The sanctions that the EPA imposes for criminal violations are
often set at similar, sometimes modest, levels. Four Texas compa-
nies were fined a total of $3.5 million under the Clean Air Act for
criminal violations that produced an explosion at two oil and chem-
ical processing facilities in Texas.158 Of this amount, $3.3 million
consisted of criminal fines, and $200,000 was a community service
payment.159 In this incident, one worker was killed, and two other
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Cf. supra note 86.
158. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Texas Companies Agree to Pay $3.5
Million for Criminal Violations of the Clean Air Act at Two Oil and Chemical Processing
Facilities (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-texas-companies-agree-pay-35-
million-criminal-violations-clean-air-act-two-oil-and [https://perma. cc/2YMM-XVFG].
159. See id.
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workers were severely injured.160 The company had also falsified
records and reports, as well as failed to comply with both environ-
mental and safety laws.161 Once again, the total penalty associated
with the fatality was below the optimal deterrence amount even if
the role of penalties in deterring other harms and regulatory vio-
lations was not taken into account.162
Criminal prosecutions sometimes lead to far lower penalties in
situations involving fatalities. The misapplication of a pesticide by
an employee of Bugman Pest and Lawn, Inc. led to the death of two
young children in Utah.163 The U.S. Department of Justice brought
criminal charges under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act against the company, Bugman Pest and Lawn, Inc.,
and the pesticide applicator.164 The EPA noted that the act “autho-
rizes only the use of misdemeanor charges to combat the unlawful
use of pesticides even when such unlawful use results in death.”165
The EPA levied sanctions against both the pesticide applicator and
the company.166 The applicator was sentenced to “six months in-
carceration and six months of home confinement as well as a period
of supervised release.”167 The company incurred a $3000 fine and
thirty-six months probation during which time it could not engage
in pesticide operations.168 The financial stakes appear to be far be-
low what would be warranted to provide efficient levels of deter-
rence to prevent two deaths.169
E. Implications for Assessment of the Adequacy of Penalty Levels
Consideration of the penalty levels assessed for regulatory vi-
olations reveals a series of consistent patterns that are borne out
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See supra note 86.
163. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bugman Pest and Lawn, Inc. and Coleman
Nocks Plead Guilty to Unlawful Use of Pesticide (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/usao/ut/news/2011/bugman%20plea.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6SJ-3UET]. 
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See supra note 86.
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across different regulatory agencies. First, agencies do not have
complete discretion to set penalty levels in a manner that is ap-
propriate in a particular instance. Rather, the maximum penalty
amounts are stipulated by the statutes and regulations governing
the particular regulatory area.170 Second, the penalty levels are not
tied to the VSL or any other methodological deterrence-related
framework, but are set at numerical levels without any associated
justification for their rationale.171 Third, the statutes that estab-
lished the penalty amounts date back almost a half century so that
the penalty amounts are often based on a different economic envi-
ronment as well as a situation in which the law and economics the-
ories of regulations and optimal deterrence were less well developed
than they are today.172 Fourth, consideration of the civil violation
penalty levels set by each of the agencies that this Article reviewed
did not reveal any instances in which the penalty amounts were at
the appropriate deterrence amounts, even if the penalties were de-
signed to address only fatalities rather than other transgressions
associated with the regulatory incident.173 Because of the statutory
guidance pertaining to limits on penalties, if all violations other
than the fatality were excluded from consideration, the penalty lev-
els would be reduced.174 Fifth, imposing possible criminal sanctions
does not necessarily lead to penalties that produce optimal levels of
deterrence.175 Such criminal sanctions can be quite stringent, as in
the case of the Peanut Corporation of America,176 but also may be
very modest, as reflected by the sanctions imposed for the pesticide
misuse that led to two deaths.177
All of the regulatory agencies considered in this Part were subject
to statutory guidelines, most of which were first established during
170. See, e.g., supra notes 27, 31, 33-35, 81, 105, 107, 135-41 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., supra notes 28, 108, 142 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
173. See supra Parts I.A-D.
174. As the review of the case studies indicated, some penalties were for illnesses or for
regulatory violations that did not necessarily lead to deaths. Excluding the portion of the
penalties related to matters other than fatality risks would necessarily reduce the amount of
penalties specifically targeted at the fatalities. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
175. Assuming that a VSL of $10 million per fatality is the appropriate deterrence
measure, the level of penalties per fatality generally falls short of that amount.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
177. See supra notes 163-69.
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the initial wave of health, safety, and environmental regulations
about a half century ago.178 There is no reason to believe that the
chosen penalty maximum values were pertinent deterrence amounts
then or would be now, even after accounting for the impact of infla-
tion.179 As indicated above, for decades the sanctions were un-
changed since the initial legislation, as evidenced by the penalty of
$5000 per violation for the GM ignition switch defect, and the
company’s failure to report the problem.180 During that time, there
has been a major shift in how federal agencies value risks to life
when designing and evaluating proposed government regulations.181
Valuations that were formerly based on the financial losses asso-
ciated with a fatality have now been supplanted by estimates of the
VSL.182 In addition, the levels of these estimates have risen over
time and converged to the amounts estimated in the economics lit-
erature.183 In terms of regulatory design, government agencies have
adopted appropriate deterrence-based measures for reducing the
risk of fatalities.184 However, for these regulations to establish
appropriate incentives for behavior, the level of regulatory penalties
associated with violations should be aligned with the values that are
pertinent when setting regulatory stringency.
178. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84. Stat.
1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012)) (creating the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and granting it authority to regulate and promote worker safety); National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (creating the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and empowering it with promoting car and
traffic safety); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (Oct. 6, 1970) (creating
the Environmental Protection Agency and authorizing it to enforce environmental protection
laws). Earlier guidelines were provided for the FDA in 1938. See Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-399 (2012)) (authorizing the FDA to regulate food, drugs, and cosmetics).
179. Using the inflation adjustment based on the BLS inflation calculator, the value of $10
million in 2017 dollars would have been $1.6 million in 1970, which is a figure that still
exceeds the maximum penalty levels throughout the period since 1970. See supra note 32.
180. See Consent Order, supra note 115, ¶¶ 5, 10-11; supra notes 109-19 and accompanying
text.
181. See Viscusi, supra note 9, at 436-41, tbls.7.2 & 7.3.
182. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 4-6.
183. Id. at 33-34.
184. See id. at 23-44.
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II. ESTABLISHING THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE REFERENCE POINT
The ultimate objective of risk and environmental regulations is
to have an impact on health, safety, and environmental outcomes.185
If these policies were public expenditure efforts then matters would
be different. The government could undertake the projects needed
to generate acceptable levels of risk. However, if the governmental
mechanism is through regulatory policies, these regulations must
alter the behavior of other economic actors to have an effect, such as
firms, consumers, and workers.186 Influencing behavior in a manner
that creates efficient levels of safety will correspond to what this
Article will refer to as the optimal deterrence reference point.187
Setting the penalty levels per fatality will establish the incentives
to promote efficient levels of safety.
A. Promoting Optimal Levels of Deterrence
In situations involving risk, policies have two principal objec-
tives—creating optimal levels of deterrence and providing optimal
levels of insurance.188 For financial risks, matters are straightfor-
ward, as it is possible for a single policy mechanism to achieve both
objectives.189 Social institutions such as tort liability that provide
full compensation for the financial harm that has occurred both
compensate the victim for the value of the harm and provide the
appropriate financial incentive for the injurer to take efficient levels
of care.190 For physical harms, such as fatalities, matters become
more complicated because financial transfers after a person’s death
do not restore their well-being to the pre-injury situation.191 Pro-
viding coverage for the financial loss suffered by the decedent’s
family addresses the financial loss, but does not address the welfare
185. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 3, at 24-27 tbl.5.
186. See infra Part II.D.
187. See infra Part II.A.
188. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 257 (2004).
189. See generally id.
190. See id. at 267-69.
191. Cf. id. at 270.
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loss of the deceased or provide adequate incentives for deterrence.192
In general, it is not feasible for a single policy mechanism to achieve
both optimal deterrence and optimal insurance in situations in-
volving fatality risks.193 Addressing only the insurance aspects
provides inadequate deterrence, and payments sufficient to provide
optimal deterrence provide excessive levels of insurance.194 Whether
there is any payment or financial incentive at all also assumes that
there is a party that has been found to be responsible for the in-
jury.195 The coverage of tort liability is incomplete, as firms or other
parties are not liable for every accident, illness, or injury that oc-
curs.196 As a consequence, government regulations often have a
critical role to play in fostering appropriate levels of safety and
environmental quality.197
Whereas tort liability is concerned with both the insurance and
deterrence objectives, risk and environmental regulations have a
narrower focus.198 These governmental efforts do not transfer funds
to injured parties or their survivors and consequently are not en-
gaged in any insurance-related functions.199 Rather, they create
incentives to generate sufficiently protective levels of safety that in
theory could address the optimal deterrence function.200 Other social
institutions such as tort liability, workers’ compensation, social in-
surance policies, and private insurance could serve the insurance
role.201
192. See id. at 243.
193. Cf. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liabil-
ity, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 567 (1977).
194. See id.
195. See SHAVELL, supra note 188, at 244.
196. See id. at 180.
197. See id. at 232.
198. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401 (2012) (stating that the purpose of the Clean
Air Act is to promote “pollution prevention,” and making no mention of insurance); National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (providing that
the purpose of the Act is to promote vehicle safety and reduce deaths, and making no mention
of insurance).
199. See supra note 198.
200. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2012) (outlining a schedule of fines under the Clean Air
Act that encourages polluters and other bad actors to reduce their pollution).
201. See, e.g., Workers’ Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/
topic/workcomp [https://perma.cc/D72S-3EKK] (explaining that workers compensation pro-
vides injured workers with wage replacement benefits and medical treatment).
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From the standpoint of creating economically efficient levels
of deterrence of risk, how should regulatory agencies value risk
reduction, and what is the magnitude of these figures? When as-
sessing the desirability of regulations or setting their stringency,
the standard procedure throughout the federal government is to use
the VSL to monetize the fatality risks reduced by the policy.202 The
VSL is the money-fatality risk tradeoff reflected in the decisions by
workers and consumers in their risk-taking activities.203 Consider
an example in which a worker faces a 1/10,000 risk of death and
receives additional wage compensation of $900.204 Then the value
per unit risk is $900/(1/10,000), or $9 million.205 Put somewhat dif-
ferently, if 10,000 workers faced similar risks and were each paid
$900 in wage compensation to bear the risk, then collectively they
would experience one expected fatality and would be compensated
a total of $9 million for this single expected fatality.206 This thought
experiment gives rise to the terminology of the “value of a statistical
life” to characterize the risk-dollar tradeoff by dividing the amount
of wage compensation for risk by the size of the risk reduction.207
B. Empirical Evidence and Policy Practices
There are many sources of empirical evidence on the VSL.208 It is
possible to use interview techniques known as stated preference
studies to elicit how much people are willing to pay for greater
safety.209 Such approaches assume that people can process hypo-
thetical risk information and give thoughtful and honest answers
to how they value hypothetical risk changes.210 Alternatively, one
could rely on revealed preference studies that assess the wage
202. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CIRCULAR
A-4, at 29-31 (2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/
a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6P-PNUY] [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4].
203. See id. at 29.
204. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 229, 234 (2010).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., id.
209. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 22-24, 29-30.
210. See id. at 24.
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premiums workers are paid for risky jobs or the price premiums
that are commanded by safer products, such as cars with a better
safety record.211 Each of these approaches can generate a monetary
premium associated with a particular change in the fatality risk.212
United States government agencies have relied on both stated pref-
erence studies and revealed preference evidence.213 Most of the
emphasis has been on labor market studies that determine the extra
pay that is commanded by hazardous jobs.214 Since workers’ employ-
ment agreements seldom specify the occupational risk and the as-
sociated hazard pay, economists have employed statistical methods
to isolate the extra premium workers are paid for dangerous jobs,
taking into account a variety of personal and job characteristics that
might affect the wage rate.215
Whereas formerly, agencies valued fatality risks based on the
compensation amounts in wrongful death cases, or what agencies
termed the “cost of death,” this practice changed in the 1980s.216 The
U.S. Office of Management and Budget rejected a proposed OSHA
regulation that would have introduced requirements that dangerous
chemicals be labelled, because in its view the costs of the regulation
exceeded the benefits.217 After appealing the regulatory decision to
then Vice-President George H.W. Bush, I was asked to settle the
dispute between the two agencies.218 Monetizing the fatality risk
benefits using the VSL led to an increase in the assessed benefits of
the regulation by an order of magnitude, and led to the issuance of
the regulation.219 Although some agencies were slow to adjust the
211. See id. at 20-21.
212. See id. at 20-24.
213. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Role of Publication Selection Bias in Estimates of the Value
of a Statistical Life, 1 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 27, 28 (2015). In some cases, agencies have used
both revealed preference and stated preference evidence. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
supra note 9, at 36.
214. See Viscusi, supra note 213, at 28.
215. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 9, at 62-64; Viscusi, supra note 213,
at 44.
216. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 4; W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 7 (1992); see also Pete Earley, What’s a Life Worth? Under
the Reagan Administration, It May Be Less Than You Thought, WASH. POST, June 9, 1985, at
11.
217. See Earley, supra note 216, at 3.
218. See id.
219. Cf. id.
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monetized value that they placed on fatality risks, there has been
increasing convergence of these estimates to figures similar to the
VSL estimates in the literature.220 As a consequence, the value that
government agencies place on fatality risks for purposes of regula-
tory impact analyses and regulatory design is in line with the VSL,
or what is considered the appropriate economic deterrence value for
fatality risks.221
The current result of this effort is that agencies have reviewed the
pertinent literature and now use VSL estimates that are often over
$9 million per expected life saved by the policy.222 The official guid-
ance values are $9.4 for the DOT,223 $9.7 million (2013 dollars) for
the EPA,224 and $9.6 million (2014 dollars) for the Department of
Health and Human Services.225 For example, the DOT bases its
figure on a review of fifteen labor market estimates of the VSL,
using Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational fatality rate data that
it considers to be the most reliable.226 Other agencies have also in-
creased their VSL estimates over time, so agencies no longer use
much lower values to monetize fatality risks, such as the amounts
that are more in line with the value of wrongful death awards.227
Recent estimates in the literature have concluded that a value of
$10 million per statistical life is in line with the estimates based on
the most reliable labor market data, which is also very similar to
the inflation-adjusted values used by many federal agencies.228 For
concreteness, this Article uses the $10 million figure for expositional
purposes as the appropriate economics deterrence value in the
discussion below.229
220. See Viscusi, supra note 9, at 436-41 tbls.7.2 & 7.3 (reviewing about one hundred
regulatory analyses and their associated VSL).
221. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 33-34.
222. See id. at 28.
223. See id. at 35.
224. See id. at 36.
225. See id. at 37.
226. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 9, at 3, 5.
227. See Viscusi, supra note 9, at 443-44.
228. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 28.
229. The $10 million figure is also used in VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 28.
2018] THE FATAL FAILURE OF THE REGULATORY STATE 619
C. How the Values Influence Regulatory Criteria
If government agencies use the VSL in setting the stringency of
government regulations, it will lead to an economically efficient
level of risk that would be consistent with legal theories of the opti-
mal levels of deterrence.230 First, to be efficient, the benefits of the
regulation must exceed the costs.231 Using the VSL to monetize the
fatality risk reduction benefits provides the appropriate basis for
calculating the benefits provided by risk and environmental regula-
tions.232 However, there may be multiple regulatory policies at dif-
ferent levels of stringency for which the benefits exceed the costs.233
The benefits may exceed costs by a greater extent for some regula-
tions than they do others.234 As a result, there is a second require-
ment for the most efficient regulatory policies, which is that the
optimal regulatory policy will generate the greatest possible spread
between benefits and costs, or the highest net benefits less costs.235
In many situations, this occurs by tightening regulatory standards
until the incremental cost of saving an additional expected life in-
creases to the point where the cost equals the VSL.236 Thus, the VSL
serves as the cutoff for setting the maximum price that should be
paid for additional levels of safety if regulatory agencies set their
regulatory standards based on benefit-cost principles.237
In some situations, agencies may go beyond this requirement in
terms of the level of stringency of the regulatory requirements.
Restrictive legislative mandates may require that agencies set reg-
ulatory policies to promote safety or environmental quality to en-
sure a safer level than might result from benefit-cost balancing.238
230. See supra Part II.A. More specifically, it sets the marginal costs equal to the VSL, as
suggested by CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 29.
231. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 1-3; see also VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
232. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 9-11.
233. See id.; CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 8.
234. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
235. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 1-3, 29.
236. See id. at 29 (noting that the VSL is the appropriate means to measure a regulation’s
benefits); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 1, at 34-36 (describing how setting marginal cost equal
to marginal benefit maximizes the gains to society from a regulatory policy).
237. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
238. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512 (1981); Indus. Union Dep’t
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 644 (1980).
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For that reason, executive branch guidance includes a provision
that exempts agencies from being bound by a benefit-cost require-
ment when this approach conflicts with their statutory mandate.239
The result is that in some situations regulations would be more
stringent than would result based on benefit-cost balancing using
the VSL, resulting in regulations with a higher cost-per-life saved
than the VSL.240
That there might be such a disparity bolsters the implicit price
that regulatory agencies place on fatality risks.241 The VSL conse-
quently serves as the floor rather than the upper bound of the value
placed on fatality risks by the regulations promulgated by the ag-
ency.242 The result that the VSL is a lower bound on the amount
that regulators assign to fatality risks is important to the analysis
of regulatory sanctions for regulatory violations that have led to
deaths.243 This Article’s review of regulatory sanctions involving
product-related deaths and job-related deaths in Part I found that
these sanctions are well below the magnitude of the VSL.244 As a
consequence, these regulatory sanctions are even further below the
implicit price that agencies assign to the expected lives saved when
setting regulations that are even more stringent than is warranted
based on benefit-cost criteria.
D. Setting the Price for Corporate Decisions
Just as the VSL serves as the reference point for how agencies
should structure regulations to provide economically efficient levels
of safety,245 the VSL also serves as the appropriate price for valuing
additional levels of safety provided by companies and other econ-
omic agents.246 The selection of safety levels incorporated in pro-
ducts, and the workplace safety conditions provided by firms, all can
239. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
240. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 3, at 24-27 tbl.5 (providing examples of these
regulations); VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 41-43.
241. Cf. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 19-20.
242. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 28, 108, 142, 171 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.
245. See supra Parts II.A-B.
246. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 221-22.
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be assessed using the same type of approach that government agen-
cies use in setting regulatory standards.247 In particular, it is desir-
able for companies to design products that provide additional levels
of safety, so long as the incremental cost of safety per statistical life
that is saved is below the price that the company assigns to each
statistical death.248 The key determinant of how the firm will select
their valuation of the fatality risks prevented by safer products will
be the price signal that the firm receives with respect to the value
of safety.249 These financial incentives can come from market forces
or through incentives created by government regulations.250 If
markets functioned perfectly so that consumers and workers were
fully cognizant of the risk, then the VSL would be transmitted to the
firm in terms of how much consumers were willing to pay for safer
products, and how much workers require to work on hazardous
jobs.251 Thus, the appropriate financial signals will be sent to the
firm automatically if markets functioned perfectly.252 But this
favorable result is unlikely to be the case in situations where the
government has chosen to intervene since the inadequacy of market
performance is typically an important determinant of whether
government regulation is warranted.253 Based on Office of Manage-
ment and Budget guidelines, a key component of the rationale for
any regulatory intervention is that the agency demonstrate that
there is a market failure.254 Otherwise, the assumption is that there
is no shortcoming that needs to be addressed by the regulation.255
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that market forces are not
setting the appropriate price for risk when agencies have enacted
regulations.256 The failure of market forces to be functioning per-
fectly is particularly likely to be the case for environmental risks.257
247. See id.
248. See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 216, at 11 (noting that firms will decide to comply with
safety regulations if the expected cost of compliance is less than the cost of noncompliance).
249. See id. at 12.
250. See id. at 11-12.
251. For an analysis of this underlying economic theory, see, e.g., id. at 10, 51.
252. Cf. id. at 51.
253. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
254. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 202, at 3-6.
255. See id. at 6-7.
256. See id. at 6.
257. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41-42 (1960).
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Risks of air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous wastes are
among the many environmental risks that are spread across broad
populations without any market transaction in which those affected
by the risk accept the risk voluntarily and are compensated for the
harm that is imposed by the risk.258
If government regulations are in place and firms fail to comply
with these regulations, what should be the appropriate regulatory
sanction to create effective incentives for safety? Given that the
focus here is on fatalities, let us consider a situation in which a
consumer has been killed by a product risk that arose because the
firm failed to manufacture the product in line with regulatory stan-
dards. If the penalty the regulatory agency levies for the fatality-
related violation equals the VSL, it will be setting an appropriate
price on greater safety that will encourage firms to adopt an
economically efficient level of product safety.259 Viewed somewhat
differently, when firms are producing products that are in violation
of the regulation, they will know that this violation will lead to a
penalty equal to the VSL in the event of a fatality, thus leading to
the internalization of the appropriate economic value for fatality
risks.260 In much the same way that government agencies can set ef-
ficient levels of safety by tightening the regulatory standards until
the incremental cost of greater levels of safety equals the VSL,261 the
firm likewise will have an incentive to internalize the appropriate
economic valuation fatality risks.262
This scenario assumes, however, that the regulatory agency can
determine that there has been a fatality and can be certain that the
fatality can be linked to a violation of regulatory standards.263 Some
fatality risk events might be quite evident, as in the case of a major
explosion that leads to a series of worker fatalities.264 However, ma-
jor catastrophes are often a best case for being able to identify that
258. For a discussion of the limitations to private bargains for environmental externalities,
see id. 
259. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237.
260. See id. at 236 (“Viewed from the standpoint of a firm, the VSL defines the amount of
money that the firm should be willing to spend to reduce the risk.”).
261. See, e.g., id. at 233-35 (describing how agencies calculate the VSL).
262. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
263. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 29.
264. See AFL-CIO, supra note 38, at 5; see also VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 29.
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harm has occurred.265 In much the same way that there is a chance
of a failure of the judicial system to detect behaviors that should
lead to tort awards,266 there also are circumstances in which there
is a chance that not all fatalities associated with regulatory vio-
lations will be known to the regulatory agency.267 For example, a
firm might fail to disclose a regulatory violation to the regulatory
agency or might enter into confidential settlements with those who
are injured by the product.268 Thus, firms potentially could engage
in behavior that decreases the ability of the regulatory agency to
identify the regulatory violation and the resulting harm.
Suppose that there is some probability (p) that the regulatory
violation leading to the fatality is known by the regulatory agency.
Then, if the penalty for a fatality associated with a regulatory vio-
lation is set at a value equal to the VSL/p, it will create the appro-
priate incentives for safety for the firm.269 The reasoning behind this
formula is that if the firm multiplies this penalty amount by the
chance that the penalty will be levied, the expected penalty amount
associated with each fatality will be the VSL.270 The analytic ra-
tionale for this approach is identical to that for setting punitive
damages in situations in which the probability of detection is be-
low 1.0.271
E. The Role of Other Financial Incentives
Establishing appropriate incentives for safety is straightforward
when the regulatory sanctions constitute the total penalty that the
265. See VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 29; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 543-44 (noting variation in the
awarding of tort damages).
267. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, supra note 38, at 5.
268. See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting GM’s failure to report vio-
lations to the regulatory agency).
269. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 242-44; cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 881 n.24 (1998).
This result assumes that the firm is risk-neutral. See id. at 886-87.
270. To be concrete, suppose the probability of detection is 0.1 and that there is one fatality.
The appropriate penalty would then be $10 million divided by 0.1, which equals $100 million.
271. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 269, at 887-96 (presenting this analysis in detail,
including tracing its historical roots to writers such as Jeremy Bentham); see also Hersch &
Viscusi, supra note 204, at 242-44 (developing the analog of this argument in situations in-
volving the VSL and fatality risks).
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firm must pay. In that instance, a penalty equal to the VSL will
suffice to create the appropriate financial incentives for safety.272
However, the company may incur other kinds of costs as well.
Wrongful death awards may provide financial compensation to the
estate of the deceased.273 If the company self-insures, then the com-
pany will pay the cost directly. If the liability costs are covered by
insurance and if the insurance policy is experience-rated, then there
will be a linkage of the value of future payments to the firm’s li-
ability history.274 In the situation of job-related accidents, state
workers’ compensation programs cover medical costs and earnings
loss.275 As in the case of general liability insurance coverage, one
would expect that the firm’s accident record will affect future premi-
ums so that the insurance payments are not costless to the firm.276
How then should the regulatory sanctions incorporate the in-
fluence of these additional financial incentives, if at all? Should
there be a downward adjustment in the regulatory penalty to ac-
count for the payments that the company will make in other
venues? If so, how should such an adjustment be made given that
wrongful death cases are not resolved at the time of the fatality, and
there may be a considerable time period before any insurance or
workers’ compensation rates can be altered to reflect the firm’s risk
history?277 Since the prospect of tort liability awards or insurance
adjustments is often uncertain,278 should the regulatory penalties
be put on hold until these are resolved? Another possibility is to
eliminate the possibility of such liability or workers’ compensation
payments if the firm is going to be penalized by the regulatory agen-
cy. Doing so would, of course, eliminate the possibility of having
total damages in excess of the VSL. While such an approach would
create efficient incentives for safety through penalties equal to the
272. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 238.
273. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 543-44.
274. See John W. Ruser, Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Experience-Rating, and Oc-
cupational Injuries, 16 RAND J. ECON. 487, 487 (1985).
275. See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 216, at 11-12, 77 (discussing the social insurance role of
workers’ compensation); Ruser, supra note 274, at 487.
276. See Ruser, supra note 274, at 487.
277. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting
a six-month jury trial).
278. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 543-44 (noting the discretion afforded juries
in setting damages).
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VSL,279 it would not serve the insurance role of meeting the income
and medical expense needs of those who are injured or the families
of the deceased.280 These social institutions play a vital, constructive
role in ameliorating the financial harms associated with risks.281
Failing to provide such compensation will lead to a welfare loss at-
tributable to the financial burdens resulting from fatalities.282 Even
if regulatory sanctions are set at a level that will establish efficient
incentives for safety when there are regulatory infractions, there
remains the additional task of ameliorating harms to those affected
by the fatality.283
Alternatively, one might devote part of the regulatory sanction to
providing payment for the financial harms that have occurred.284
That would convert regulatory agencies into social insurance agen-
cies, which is currently outside of the purview of their responsi-
bilities.285 Practical problems of implementation would also arise. In
the case of wrongful death litigation, the firm would not have a fi-
nancial incentive to defend against a claim for compensation that is
less than the regulatory sanction. If the regulatory agency wanted
to increase the portion of the sanction that went to the government,
it would be in the odd position of defending corporate conduct that
it found to be in violation of its regulatory standards. As a result,
shifting the burden of providing coverage for financial losses to the
regulatory agency is likely to be both unworkable as well as incon-
sistent with the agencies’ role as regulators of health, safety, and
environmental quality,286 rather than assuming a more broadly
based insurance function.
279. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237.
280. See id. at 238-39.
281. See, e.g., supra note 190 and accompanying text.
282. Cf. supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., supra notes 85, 131 and accompanying text.
285. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 539-40 (highlighting the role of regulatory
agencies by detailing differences from tort law).
286. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSI-
BILITIES FOLLOWING AN OSHA INSPECTION, OSHA 3000-O4R (2018), https://www.osha.gov/
Publications/osha3000.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9TK-7EZG] (noting OSHA’s role as a promoter
of health and safety) [hereinafter EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES]; supra note 185
and accompanying text.
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One possibility is to ignore the potential additional payment
amounts and simply impose regulatory sanctions equal to the
VSL.287 Thus, the financial penalty would equal the VSL plus the
cost to the firm of whatever additional compensation that is re-
quired to provide income support for those affected by the tragedy.288
Although this approach represents a departure from setting the
penalty precisely at the level of the VSL,289 it may not involve a
great departure. Suppose, for example, that the penalty level is set
at $10 million and the wrongful death award is $1 million. Then the
departure from the efficient penalty amount would only be an ad-
ditional 10 percent of financial sanctions above the efficient level for
promoting safety.
In addition to being only a modest premium above the VSL, there
are several reasons why such a penalty premium might be war-
ranted. First, it is not always feasible to identify all regulatory viola-
tions so that the ex ante probability of determining that a fatality
occurred and was due to a regulatory violation may be less than 1.0,
particularly if the company does not report product defects to the
government.290 A prominent example of such behavior is that of the
GM ignition switch failure for which the company failed to report
the defect to the NHTSA.291 At the time the agency imposed reg-
ulatory sanctions, the company had reported 13 switch-related
deaths, which the agency thought was a low estimate, with the ul-
timate death toll being 124 deaths.292 Based on theories of optimal
deterrence, the penalty should exceed the efficient deterrence
amount with perfect information about the harm.293 Second, pen-
alizing the company based solely on the VSL only replicates what
the company should have done based on setting an efficient level of
safety.294 But the company has incurred a regulatory violation for
which some might suggest that there be an additional punishment
287. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 238.
288. Cf. id.
289. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
291. See Consent Order, supra note 115, at ¶¶ 5, 10-11.
292. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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amount.295 Third, the regulatory sanction affects prospective be-
havior and the appropriate future levels of safety.296 But if the
company is guilty of a regulatory violation that has led to fatalities,
there still remains the welfare loss to the survivors of the deceased,
which will also generate an efficiency loss from the standpoint of not
meeting their legitimate insurance needs.297 Setting an additional
cost above the VSL serves the additional constructive objective of
providing compensation.298 Finally, given the importance of both
promoting safety and providing compensation, some legal scholars
such as Judge Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein have advocated
payments for wrongful death cases that include compensation for
financial losses as well as the VSL in order to provide adequate
insurance and deterrence.299 This proposal is more limited in that it
introduces the VSL in addition to conventional tort remedies only
in instances in which there are regulatory violations.300
F. Implications for Setting the Deterrence-Based Penalty Levels
Basing the penalties for regulatory violations that lead to
fatalities on the VSL will send the appropriate price signals to
firms with respect to providing adequate control of risks.301 Govern-
ment agencies have adopted this approach for the design of
regulations.302 As the review of the penalties assessed by OSHA,
FDA, NHTSA, and EPA indicated, the current magnitude of the
penalties levied for fatalities is quite low, and far below the VSL.303
The statutory caps on fines may limit the sanctions to levels that
may now be just over one thousandth of the VSL.304 As a result, even
295. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 269, at 957-962 (noting that there is often a
similar provision for the role of punishment in determining punitive damages, but whether
and how such punishment should enter remains controversial).
296. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237.
297. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
299. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 537-41, 554.
300. See id.
301. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237; supra Part II.D.
302. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237.
303. See supra Part I.
304. Assuming a VSL of $10 million, then the aforementioned OSHA penalty caps of $7,000
and other penalty figures below $10,000 would be less than 1/1,000th of the optimal deter-
rence amount. For the updated value of the OSHA penalty cap of $12,934, the VSL would be
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if regulatory agencies fully exploited the leeway that they have in
setting penalties, the sanctions would be far too low to send mean-
ingful financial signals to firms regarding the importance of reduc-
ing health risks.305 Implementing the use of the VSL for regulatory
enforcement would make the economic incentives created by the
enforcement of regulatory policies consistent with the economic
principles on which regulations are designed.306 On a decentralized
basis, firms then would be making the calculations of the costs and
benefits of safety that parallel the assessments that comprise
regulatory impact analyses by government agencies.307
III. RECTIFYING THE PENALTY STRUCTURE
Altering the penalty structure to accommodate a more deterrence-
based penalty approach does not require that all such limits be
abolished. However, it is essential to raise these limits to make it
possible both to reflect the VSL level in setting the penalty and to
make allowances for the number of deaths that have occurred.308
Thus, there often must be a revision in the penalty amount, because
this amount is determined by factors such as the number of vi-
olations, or whether it can also be altered based on the number of
fatalities. Consideration of different prominent statutes for the reg-
ulatory agencies discussed above illustrates the range of modifi-
cations that are required.309
A. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Analysis of the revisions for OSHA is relatively straightforward
since the agency’s statutory guidelines are derived from a single
law, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.310 The law
has provisions for sanctions for a variety of different types of vio-
lations—serious violations, other than serious violations, posting
773 times greater than $12,934.
305. See supra Part I.
306. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 237.
307. See id.
308. See supra Part I.
309. See supra Part I.
310. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1903.1 (2017).
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requirements, failure to abate violations, and willful or repeated
violations.311 Raising the penalty limits would be desirable in each
instance.312
The most pertinent violation category for risks of fatality are se-
rious violations. “A serious violation exists when the workplace haz-
ard could cause an accident or illness that would most likely result
in death or serious physical harm, unless the employer did not know
or could not have known of the violation.”313 For this class of viola-
tions, the original cap on penalties was set at $7000:
Any employer who has received a citation for a serious violation
of the requirements of section 654 of this title, or any standard,
rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title,
or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, shall
be assessed a civil penalty of up to $7,000 for each such viola-
tion.314
A subsequent update of the penalty amount raised the upper limit
on penalties to $12,934 per violation.315
Modifying the statutory language to generate optimal levels of
deterrence requires replacing the $12,934 limit with an upper limit
of $10 million,316 leading to the following proposed changed language
in § 666(b):
Any employer who has received a citation for a serious violation
of the requirements of section 654 of this title, or any standard,
rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title,
or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, shall
be assessed a civil penalty of up to [$12,934] for each such
violation [unless such a violation results in a person’s death, in
which case the employer shall be assessed a penalty up to
$10,000,000 per death caused by the violation].317
311. See EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 286, at 2, 5-6; supra notes
25-26, 33 and accompanying text.
312. See text accompanying notes 70-71.
313. Federal Employer Rights, supra note 25.
314. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2012).
315. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3) (2018).
316. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
317. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b).
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It would also be appropriate to lift the cap for other kinds of vi-
olations; however, other-than-serious may be less likely to involve
fatalities than serious violations.318 Other-than-serious violations
are directly related to job safety and health, but do not qualify as
serious.319 One might think that given the categorization of such
violations, penalties appropriate for deterring risks of fatalities
would never be warranted. As in the case of serious violations, the
statutory cap of $7000 per violation was raised to $12,934 per
violation.320 Raising the cap to $10 million if the violation involved
fatalities, with language following that used for serious violations
could nevertheless come into play if the violation did not merit the
serious designation because there was the risk of a fatality, but the
probability of death was not so great that the violation “would most
likely result in death or serious physical harm.”321 However, even if
the probability of death was not sufficiently high to qualify as being
categorized as “most likely” to cause death, the VSL provides the
pertinent sanction conditional on a death occurring.322 Suppose, for
example, that the risk of death is only 1/10 and, for simplicity,
assume that there is only a risk of a single death. Then with a
regulatory sanction of $10 million for each fatality that has oc-
curred, the company will undertake the safety improvement to elim-
inate the violation so long as the cost is under $1 million.323 The
VSL-based penalty structure establishes the appropriate, effective
financial incentives for safety.324
 Posting requirements are the requirements that employers must
post notices of violations near the place where the violation oc-
curred.325 Posting requirements can play an important role with re-
spect to safety if they serve to alert workers to dangerous conditions
that pose the risk of fatality. Alerting workers to these conditions
may lead them to be more cautious in avoiding exposure to the risk
that led to the violation, or it could prompt them to identify related
318. See Federal Employer Rights, supra note 25.
319. See id.
320. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(c), with 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(4).
321. Federal Employer Rights, supra note 25.
322. See generally Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 233-34 (noting that the VSL con-
siders small risks of death).
323. See generally supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
325. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.16(a) (2017).
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violations pertinent to their safety. Revision of the statutory cap of
$7000 to $12,934 when fatalities are not involved,326 and $10
million per fatality when the failure to post results in a person’s
death327 would establish the appropriate deterrence-based incen-
tives.328
Suppose that a company has been found guilty of a violation but
has not remedied the safety infraction.329 OSHA has two classifica-
tions for violations related to that behavior. The less severe sit-
uation is that of a “failure to abate” violation: “A failure to abate
violation exists when a previously cited hazardous condition, prac-
tice or non-complying equipment has not been brought into com-
pliance since the prior inspection ... and is discovered at a later
inspection.”330 However, the penalty for this classification of viola-
tions is not in terms of the penalty per violation, but the penalty per
day where there is a statutory cap of $7000331 that has since been
raised to $12,934 per day.332 As a result, this Article’s proposed re-
vision to § 666(d) of the statute is a bit different in that it will be in
terms of penalty per day, not per violation:
Any employer who fails to correct a violation for which a citation
has been issued under section 658(a) of this title within the
period permitted for its correction (which period shall not begin
to run until the date of the final order of the Commission in the
case of any review proceeding under section 659 of this title
initiated by the employer in good faith and not solely for delay
or avoidance of penalties), may be assessed a civil penalty of not
more than [$12,934] for each day during which such failure or
violation continues. [If the failure to abate results in death, the
326. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(6).
327. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
330. EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 286, at 6; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 666(d) (“Any employer who fails to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued
under section 658(a) of this title within the period permitted for its correction (which period
shall not begin to run until the date of the final order of the Commission in the case of any
review proceeding under section 659 of this title initiated by the employer in good faith and
not solely for delay or avoidance of penalties), may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than
$7,000 for each day during which such failure or violation continues.”).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d).
332. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(6) (2018).
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employer shall be assessed a penalty up to $10,000,000 per
additional death caused by the failure to abate.]333
As a result, my proposed penalty structure retains a daily penalty
amount for failing to post the notice that follows the current penalty
structure, but adds the possibility of having a penalty amount of up
to $10 million per fatality that has resulted from this particular
violation. It would not be appropriate to mimic the current daily
penalty structure by adding a $10 million penalty per day of failure
to abate violations since that would lead to excessive levels of de-
terrence.334
Willful and repeated violations of regulatory standards have sig-
nificantly greater caps than do other violation categories.335 “A
willful violation is defined as a violation in which the employer
either knowingly failed to comply with a legal requirement (pur-
poseful disregard) or acted with plain indifference to employee
safety.”336 The criteria are somewhat different than that of failure
to abate violations for whether a violation is repeated: “An employer
may be cited for a repeated violation if that employer has been cited
previously, within the last five years, for the same or a substantially
similar condition or hazard and the citation has become a final
order.”337 The penalty structure for these violations includes a
penalty ceiling that is ten times greater than that for other violation
categories, as the upper limit is $70,000 in the statute and $129,336
based on the penalty update.338 From a deterrence standpoint, a
higher penalty level may be warranted from the standpoint of a
probability of detecting a willful or repeated violation that is less
than 1.0.339 In addition, the statute specifies a penalty floor of $5000
333. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d).
334. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 188, at 244.
335. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(1)-(2).
336. Federal Employer Rights, supra note 25.
337. EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 286, at 6; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 666(a) (“Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of section 654
of this title, any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or
regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty of not more
than $70,000 for each violation, but not less than $5,000 for each willful violation.”).
338. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), with 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(1)-(2).
339. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 269, at 960-62; supra notes 269-71 and accom-
panying text.
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for each willful violation.340 This Article’s proposed revision to
§ 666(a) of the statute is that:
Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the require-
ments of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order
promulgated pursuant to § 655, of this title, or regulations pre-
scribed pursuant to this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty
of not more than [$129,336] for each violation, but not less than
[$9239] for each willful violation. [In addition, any additional
death caused by the willful or repeated violation assessed under
this section shall result in an additional penalty of at least
$10,000,000 for each death, but not to exceed $100,000,000 for
each death.]341
Unless OSHA has reason to believe that the firm engaged in willful
or repeated behavior that had a low probability of detection, a pen-
alty cap of $10 million would be pertinent.342 But if the company was
guilty of stealthy behavior and sought to prevent OSHA from
learning about its violations, then a penalty in line with optimal
deterrence theory would be warranted.343 To date, neither the courts
nor federal agencies have embraced linking the regulatory sanctions
to the probability of detection.344 But the proposed penalty structure
in this Article does not preclude the imposition of additional pen-
alties such as those that are related to failure to report motor-
vehicle defects to NHTSA or drug-related fatalities to the FDA,
where such behaviors may affect the ability of regulators to identify
regulatory violations.
B. Food and Drug Administration
The FDA has a variety of regulatory responsibilities, but the focus
of the examples provided in Part I.B was on food safety, which will
340. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).
341. Id.
342. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 269, at 960-62.
343. See id.
344. The natural context in which this deterrence value would arise would be with respect
to punitive damages. See id. However, in setting guidance for punitive damages, the Supreme
Court has provided no indication of embracing this formula but instead has opted for a sug-
gested usual cap of punitive damages not exceeding compensatory damages by more than a
single digit ratio. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
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be the emphasis here as well. As in the case of OSHA, there are
legislative caps on the penalty amounts, but the specified levels
are greater than for OSHA, with caps sometimes as great as
$500,000.345 Nevertheless, it is essential to raise the statutory
caps so that penalties can be in line with the optimal deterrence
amounts.346 Adding a clause indicating the penalty caps in situa-
tions involving fatalities is sufficient to accomplish this change for
a wide range of FDA regulations. Thus, the statutory language can
remain unchanged except for the addition of a provision to permit
sanctions of up to $10 million per fatality.347 In the case of adulter-
ated food, this Article’s proposed statutory language in § 333(f )(2)(A)
is the following:
Any person who introduces into interstate commerce or delivers
for introduction into interstate commerce an article of food that
is adulterated within the meaning of section 342(a)(2)(B) of this
title or any person who does not comply with a recall order
under section 350l of this title shall be subject to a civil money
penalty of not more than $50,000 in the case of an individual
and $250,000 in the case of any other person for such introduc-
tion or delivery, not to exceed $500,000 for all such violations
adjudicated in a single proceeding[, unless the violation results
in death, in which case the person will be fined not more than
$10,000,000 per death.]348
Adding the clause “unless the violation results in death, in which
case the person will be fined not more than $10,000,000 per death”
suffices to make the cap no longer overly restrictive.
Similar changes can rectify the structure of other FDA statutory
provisions, such as those pertaining to medical devices. In the case
of medical device violations, the statutory cap was set at “$1,000,000
for all such violations adjudicated in a single proceeding.”349 This
cap has since increased to approximately $1.8 million.350 Once again,
345. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f)(2)(A), (g)(1) (2012).
346. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
348. § 333(f)(2)(A). This proposed text is identical to that in the statute except for the ad-
dendum regarding $10 million.
349. Id. § 333(f)(1)(A).
350. See 45 C.F.R. § 102.3 (2017).
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there should be an exception for a violation that results in a death,
in which case the cap should not be more than $10 million per
death.351
However, to align the penalty structure with optimal deterrence
amounts, additional changes may be required. The damages caps
for post-market studies and clinical trials might appear to be mostly
in line with the optimal deterrence amounts because they include a
statutory cap of $10,000,000.352 The statute specifies that penalties
for violations are “not to exceed $10,000,000 for all such violations
adjudicated in a single proceeding.”353 However, this cap is also in-
sufficient as it does not accommodate the possibility of multiple
deaths that may be involved in large scale uses of a drug. Moreover,
because the statutory penalties also include additional sanctions
for certain matters (for example, doubling penalties for each thirty-
day period, or any portion thereof, that the party is in violation) the
penalties are not tied to the adverse health outcomes alone.354 I
would advocate the $10 million penalty cap per fatality and also
propose eliminating any upper bound on the total civil penalty.355
Thus, this Article’s proposed statute would include the following
addition to § 333: “If the violation results in a death, the person will
be fined not more than $10,000,000 per death without a cap on the
civil monetary penalty amount.”
C. Department of Transportation
The statutory guidance for motor-vehicle safety violations is well-
defined and has an implausibly small cap given the large number of
people who could be affected by a mass marketed consumer prod-
uct.356 As was discussed in connection with the GM ignition switch
defect, NHTSA had a statutory cap of $35 million on a related series
of violations.357 While this cap has since been increased to $105
351. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
352. 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012).
353. See id.
354. See id. § 333(f)(4)(A)(ii).
355. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
356. See 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
357. See 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (2012), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. I 2014);
see also Plungis & Higgins, supra note 111, at 534.
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million,358 that amount would be too low if there were more than
ten fatalities related to the violation.359 Violations for transgres-
sions other than the fatalities also may affect the total penalty
amount so that it would be inappropriate to cap the penalty at the
optimal penalty value for the fatalities alone.360 To rectify this sit-
uation, this Article proposes the following statutory language to
section 30165(a)(1):
A person that violates any of section 30112, 30115, 30117
through 30122, 30123(a), 30125(c), 30127, 30141 through 30147,
or 301137, or a regulation prescribed thereunder, [that results
in death,] is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not more than [$10,000,000 for each death. A separate
violation occurs for each death caused by a defect in a motor ve-
hicle or item of motor-vehicle equipment. There is no maximum
penalty under this subsection for any related series of viola-
tions.]361
Because the penalties pertain not only to fatalities but also to mat-
ters such as the failure to report the defect to NHTSA in a timely
manner, the overall penalty cap is not constrained to the fatality-
related amounts alone, but can exceed the $10 million per fatality
amount.
D. Environmental Protection Agency
Amending the statutory guidance of the EPA requires similar
kinds of changes in that there are statutory caps on penalties that
prevent the penalty structure from being aligned with optimal de-
terrence amounts.362 Typically, the changes involve specifying that
penalties of up to $10 million per fatality be allowed.363 If there are
also rationales for sanctions other than for fatalities related to
358. See § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
359. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
361. See § 30165(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2017).
362. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (Supp. IV 2017); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(d)(1) (2012); supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 228-29
and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
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regulatory violations, then a provision for a higher total penalty
amount may be appropriate.364 Because of the strong parallels in the
nature of the statutory revisions across different areas of agency
responsibility, the focus here is on three representative policy areas:
(1) the regulation of toxic substances, (2) the regulation of water
quality, and (3) the regulation of air quality.
In the case of the Toxic Substances Control Act, the fines are
limited to an upper limit of $250,000 for an individual and
$1,000,000 for an organization, though there is also the possibility
of criminal sanctions.365 While the statute specifically provided
penalties for placing “an individual in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury,” it did not establish a penalty structure com-
mensurate with these harms.366 To address the shortcoming, this
Article proposes the following language in § 2615(b)(2)(A) for in-
dividuals to incorporate the $10 million optimal deterrence value367
in the specification of the penalty structure:
Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision
of section 2614 or 2689 of this title, and who knows at the time
of the violation that the violation places an individual in im-
minent danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall be subject
on conviction to a fine of not more than $250,000, or imprison-
ment for not more than 15 years, or both, [unless the violation
results in a death, in which case the person will be fined not
more than $10,000,000 per death].368
The counterpart provision for organizations would include a per vi-
olation penalty cap of $1 million when the sanctions are for vio-
lations other than those involving fatalities.369
Fatalities can also result from violations of the Clean Water Act.
However, this penalty structure is not linked to the health outcomes
per se, but is set in terms of a daily penalty rate of $25,000 per day
for each violation.370 Thus, if the EPA identifies a violation that led
364. See, e.g., supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
365. See 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 2017).
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
368. See § 2615(b)(2)(A).
369. Cf. id. § 2615(b)(2)(B).
370. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012).
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to a fatality, but occurred for under 400 days, the resulting maxi-
mum penalty would be under the appropriate optimal deterrence
amount for a fatality.371 Inserting the following statutory language
in § 1319(d) would rectify the situation:
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under
section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a State, or
in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, or
any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8) of this title, and any
person who violates any order issued by the Administrator un-
der subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil pen-
alty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation. [If a
person’s violations of this statute cause the death of another
person, the violator shall be subject to a civil penalty not to ex-
ceed $10,000,000 per death for each death.]372
The penalties under the Clean Air Act are similar to those for
other environmental violations, but there are also provisions for
criminal penalties linked to fatalities. The civil penalties for Clean
Air Act violations are set as follows: “The Administrator may issue
an administrative order against any person assessing a civil ad-
ministrative penalty of up to $25,000, per day of violation.... The
Administrator’s authority under this paragraph shall be limited to
matters where the total penalty sought does not exceed $200,000.”373
Once again, it is straightforward to revise the language for civil
penalties outlined in § 7413(d)(1) as follows:
The Administrator may issue an administrative order against
any person assessing a civil administrative penalty of up to
$25,000, per day of violation, [unless the violation results in
death, in which case the Administrator shall assess a civil
administrative penalty of not more than $10,000,000 per death.]
The Administrator’s authority under this paragraph shall be
limited to matters where the total penalty sought does not
371. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
372. § 1319(d).
373. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2012).
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exceed $200,000, [unless the civil administrative penalties are
assessed for deaths, in which case there shall be no cap on the
penalty amount.]374
The criminal penalty fines under the Clean Air Act make specif-
ic reference to fatalities in terms of a “misdemeanor resulting in
death.”375 The current upper limits of such penalties, $250,000 for
individuals376 and $500,000 for organizations,377 can be replaced by
penalties that should not be more than $10,000,000 per death.
Recognition of the VSL and permitting the penalties to incorporate
the total number of deaths will rectify the principal shortcomings of
the current penalty structure.
E. Implications for Regulatory Enforcement
Revising the statutes to permit regulatory sanctions that will
provide optimal levels of deterrence has many commonalities across
the different regulatory agencies. The principal change needed is
allowing penalties of up to $10 million per fatality to establish
deterrence-based penalty levels.378 In addition, there also may be
situations in which it is desirable to eliminate the cap on overall
penalty levels if it is important to provide leeway to take into
account the role of other sanctions.379
Raising the statutory cap does not, however, ensure that regula-
tory agencies will levy penalties that are in line with the cap.380 One
possibility is to not give agencies leeway, but instead specify that,
when regulatory violations result in a fatality, the penalty per fa-
tality must equal $10 million. Doing so would be a major departure
from the current statutory approach, which gives the agency dis-
cretion in setting penalty amounts up to some maximum value.381
374. Id.
375. Id. § 7413(c). The Clean Air Act refers to 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2012) for the schedule of
fines. See id.
376. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(4) (2012).
377. See id. § 3571 (c)(4).
378. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
379. See, e.g., supra notes 344, 353-55, 361, and accompanying text.
380. As discussed in Part I, many agencies levy penalties that are below the statutory caps.
For example, the median penalty levied by OSHA for fatal violations in Fiscal Year 2016 was
$6500—less than the $7000 cap. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Parts III.A-D.
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Even without making the $10 million penalty amount a require-
ment, the establishment of a cap that is significantly greater than
the current caps will conceivably have an anchoring effect, signaling
to regulators that fines in this general range are warranted and
appropriate for creating meaningful safety incentives. If regulators
were concerned about setting penalties to create optimal levels of
deterrence, they also might value retaining some leeway in setting
sanctions to account for the role of other financial sanctions that
may be operative, such as workers’ compensation premium amounts
or settlement funds for accident victims.382 The regulators might
wish to also take these costs into account when determining the
total penalty level.383 Providing regulators with an understanding
of the principles of optimal deterrence,384 rather than simply high-
lighting the potential for setting the penalty at a new, higher level
than before, may assist them in formulating an effective enforce-
ment approach.
IV. PENALTIES AND CORPORATE RISK ANALYSES
The ultimate objective of imposing penalties is not simply to shift
money from companies to the government, but rather it is to create
incentives that will incentivize regulatory compliance and lead to
greater levels of health, safety, and environmental quality.385 In
making their risk decisions, companies should take into account the
various financial incentives for safety that are generated through
regulations, tort liability, and the market.386 The review that is pre-
sented below of corporate risk analyses indicates that the damages
amounts that firms pay in tort liability often play an instrumental
role in establishing the financial incentives that companies take into
account.387 However, the incentives created by tort liability, which
are based largely on the financial loss suffered by the decedents and
their families, rather than the VSL, fall short of those needed to
382. For a discussion of the ways that a regulatory agency could incorporate the influence
of other financial incentives, see generally supra Part II.E.
383. See infra note 384 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part II.A.
385. See EMPLOYER’S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITES, supra note 286; supra Part II.D.
386. See VISCUSI, supra note 216, at 12; supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
387. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
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create efficient levels of deterrence.388 This shortfall is especially
likely to be great for fatalities resulting from occupational expo-
sures, since companies are not subject to the usual tort liability
remedies when workers’ compensation coverage is provided.389 This
Part provides a review of some of the examples of corporate risk
analyses and their failure to incorporate the VSL in their moneti-
zation of the costs of fatalities. Changing the penalty structure for
regulatory violations by eliminating the current penalty caps and
having government agencies base their penalties on the VSL, as
outlined in the previous Part, would transform the valuations that
companies assign to the prevention of fatalities through their
product safety decisions.390 However, undertaking a risk analysis of
safety-related matters is not innocuous, as it may have adverse ram-
ifications for the company’s liability and whether usual criteria for
the award of punitive damages are met.391 Thus, this Article pro-
poses coupling the shift to the VSL-based approach with additional
legal protections for companies undertaking responsible risk an-
alyses.392
A. The Ford Pinto Experience
A particularly prominent example of a corporate risk assessment
related to product-safety decisions is the risk analysis undertaken
by Ford with respect to the Ford Pinto. The company’s analysis per-
tained to the location of the gas tank, the costs associated with the
gas tank’s placement, the injuries and fatalities associated with
different placements, and the economic value of the accident-related
costs.393 The main matter of concern was whether incurring an ad-
ditional cost to move the gas tank from the rear of the vehicle to
388. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 539-40; W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper
Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal Contexts, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 111, 124 (2000).
389. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 4.01, cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Workers’-com-
pensation law provides an exclusive remedy for the workplace harm. Exclusivity provisions
preclude other causes of action against the employer, its employees, or its agents for the
harms these laws cover.”).
390. See supra Parts III.A-D; see also supra Part II.D.
391. See infra Parts IV.A-D.
392. See infra Part IV.E.
393. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013,
1020-25 (1991).
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reduce the risk of fire-related injuries upon rear impact warranted
the additional expense.394 Based on the risk analysis, Ford conclud-
ed that the placement of the gas tank in a position that made it
vulnerable to rear impacts was desirable from the standpoint of cor-
porate profitability.395 The safer gas tank design imposed an ad-
ditional cost of $137.5 million, which greatly exceeded what Ford
considered to be the safety benefit from moving the tank, which it
estimated to be approximately $50 million.396 Ford used a $200,000
value to monetize each fatality that would be reduced by changing
the risky gas tank placement, which was in line with wrongful death
awards at that time.397
After a Ford Pinto was rear-ended, the driver was killed and
Richard Grimshaw, the thirteen-year-old passenger, was injured.398
In the subsequent case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,399 the plain-
tiffs attributed the injuries to the defective product design for the
fuel filler pipe and the placement of the gas tank behind the rear
axle, leading the jury to make a punitive damages award of $125
million, a compensatory damages award of $2.5 million to Grim-
shaw, and a $560,000 award to the driver’s estate.400 Although the
rationale for the particular punitive damages amount is not known,
the relatively minor cost of the design change of $11 per vehicle may
have appeared to have been inconsequential in relation to a fatality
and a serious personal injury.401 The vantage point for the jury’s
retrospective assessment was a comparison of the unit cost of the
design change and the value of the harms caused by the accident.402
The punitive damages award was later reduced to $3.5 million.403 In
addition to the very high financial penalties, Ford was also pilloried
by the media for its analysis of the financial costs and benefits of
the design change.404
394. See id. at 1020.
395. See id.
396. See id.; see also W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 111-13 (1991).
397. See VISCUSI, supra note 396, at 111.
398. See Schwartz, supra note 393, at 1016-17.
399. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
400. See id. at 358.
401. See VISCUSI, supra note 396, at 111.
402. See W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to Promote Efficiency, 39
HARV. J. LEGIS. 139, 146-47 (2002).
403. See Schwartz, supra note 393, at 1017.
404. See, e.g., Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Sept.-Oct. 1977), http://www.
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B. GM’s Risk Analysis Efforts
GM similarly used comparable litigation cost estimates to value
fatalities in its analysis of the injury costs associated with fires
resulting from accident-related impacts on side-saddle fuel tanks.405
Placement of the fuel tanks outside the frame of a vehicle made
them vulnerable to crash impacts, but alternative placement of the
tanks would entail additional costs.406 The engineer assessed the
value of the fatalities that would result from the proposed vehicle
design and monetized the fatalities using a value of $200,000, as in
the case of the Ford Pinto analysis.407 With an estimated maximum
number of deaths between 550 to 1000 from fuel-fed fires, the an-
alysis concluded that the cost of the safety enhancement was too
great to warrant the additional expenditures to avoid the injuries
that would be prevented.408 The driver of a GM pickup truck that
had this risky gas tank placement was injured and subsequently
died when the gas tank of his GM truck caught fire after having
been broadsided by a drunk driver.409 The GM analysis, in which the
company assessed the costs and benefits of a safer design and chose
not to incur the additional cost, led to a “constant refrain among the
jurors interviewed” that “they knew” about the risk.410 The jury
award in this case was $101 million in punitive damages, $4 million
in compensatory damages, and $1 in pain and suffering damages.411
There was no apparent sound methodological basis that the jury
used in setting the punitive damages award, such as a VSL. Rather,
the jury constructed the figure by engaging in the arbitrary exercise
of multiplying $20 per vehicle by the five million GM trucks on the
road, and then adding an extra $1 million “exclamation point.”412
The same GM risk analysis memo also played a pivotal role in a
subsequent case involving a rear-end crash of a Chevrolet Malibu
motherjones.com/poloitics/1977/09/pinto-madness [https://perma.cc/GDE7-36FD].
405. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 311-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
406. See id.
407. See The ‘Ivey Memo,’ CNN (Sept. 10, 1999, 11:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9909/10/
ivey.memo/ [https://perma.cc/EQD7-Z34S].
408. See id.
409. See Gen. Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d at 305.
410. Terence Moran, GM Burns Itself, AM. LAW., Apr. 1993, at 68, 69.
411. See Gen. Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d at 305.
412. See Moran, supra note 410, at 69, 82.
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that caused burn injuries for all of the occupants.413 Whereas the
GM memo compared the design costs and the monetized health
benefits based on the average costs of wrongful death cases, one
plaintiff attorney asserted that the jurors believed that the company
should have had a different perspective: “The jurors wanted to send
a message to General Motors that human life is more important
than profits.”414 In setting their punitive damages amount, the jury
used the long term trajectory of GM’s advertising expenses415 as its
seemingly arbitrary reference point for the appropriate damages
amount, which amounted to two-thirds of GM’s profit in 1998.416 The
result of basing the punitive damages value on these anchors was
a compensatory damages award of $107.6 million, and a punitive
damages award of $4.8 billion.417
To the extent that punitive damages serve a deterrence function,
constructing the punitive damages value based on the VSL would
have provided an appropriate deterrence-based reference point, as
opposed to the multibillion-dollar award level.418 If one uses the VSL
as the maximum value for preventing the risk of nonfatal injuries,
then adoption of the VSL as the upper bound value of each individ-
ual’s loss as the regulatory sanction would provide adequate de-
terrence, with no additional punitive damages needed to establish
the efficient level of care.419 Thus, in instances such as these in
which juries may impose inordinately large awards, the VSL could
potentially play a restraining role, in addition to aligning penalties
with the appropriate deterrence amounts.
413. See GM Hit by $4.9B Verdict, CNN MONEY (July 9, 1999, 5:54 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/1999/07/09/home_auto/gm_verdict/ [https://perma.cc/2XEE-R6AS]; Andrew Pollack, $4.9
Billion Jury Verdict in G.M. Fuel Tank Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1999), https://www.
nytimes.com/1999/07/10/us/4.9-billion-jury-verdict-in-gm-fuel-tank-case.html [https://
perma.cc/ZX45-B92A].
414. Pollack, supra note 413. 
415. See Michael White, Record $4.9 Billion Award in GM Trial, DESERET NEWS (July 10,
1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/706711/Record-49-billion-award-in-
GM-trial.html [https://perma.cc/F4DT-4M3G].
416. See Frank Swoboda & Caroline E. Mayer, Jury Hits GM with Historic Crash Verdict,
WASH. POST (July 10, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/sup
court/stories/jury071099.htm [https://perma.cc/SUB3-ZNQS].
417. See Pollack, supra note 413.
418. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 204, at 238, 240.
419. See id.
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C. Controversial Risk Analyses by Ford and Chrysler
There are other examples of companies that have been subject to
criticism for undertaking similar efforts to balance costs and ben-
efits. Ford came under such criticism in Miles v. Ford Motor Co.420
for its risk analysis involving a “tension eliminator” for the shoulder
harness on a seatbelt.421
Syson[, the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert,] testified
that when Ford identified what it believed was a defective prod-
uct it would first run a “cost benefit” analysis to see what the
cost would be to fix or repair the defect. Next, Ford would assign
arbitrary values to each death or serious injury and would
predict the number of occurrences which would involve either
death or serious injury. Finally, Ford would determine the cost
to litigate such deaths and injuries. Syson testified that if the
cost to repair the defect exceeded the other costs, Ford would not
correct the defect.422
In this case, Ford incurred both compensatory and punitive damage
awards, where its transgressions included running a cost-benefit an-
alysis and assigning a monetary value on the deaths and serious in-
juries based on the litigation costs associated with these adverse
health outcomes.423
Chrysler Corporation likewise was punished with $250 million
punitive damages in Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp.424 because it under-
took a similar analysis of the risks and costs which in this case per-
tained to a door latch design.425 As in the earlier examples, the
company calculated the costs of an alternative, safer design and
compared those costs to the economic value or the reduction in fa-
talities.426 The monetization of the health effects did not focus on the
420. 922 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.
1998).
421. Id. at 579.
422. Id. at 588-89.
423. See id. at 588-89, 598-99.
424. 74 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 (D.S.C. 1999), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Jimenez
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 2001).
425. See id. at 557-61.
426. See Donald C. Dilworth, Jurors Punish Chrysler for Hiding Deadly Defect, FREE LIBR.
BY FARLEX (Feb. 1, 1998), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Jurors+punish+Chrysler+for+hiding
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VSL or government sanctions for safety defects, but instead relied
on the value that the companies would pay in wrongful death suits:
“Chrysler officials at the highest level cold-bloodedly calculated that
acknowledging the problem and fixing it would be more expensive,
in terms of bad publicity and lost sales, than concealing the defect
and litigating the wrongful death suits that inevitably would re-
sult.”427 Once again, a company analysis focused on the litigation
damages payments rather than regulatory sanctions or the use of
measures such as the VSL to monetize the fatality risks.
D. The Decline in Corporate Risk Analysis Efforts
Perhaps as a result of these adverse experiences with risk an-
alyses, there appears to be few recent examples of motor-vehicle
companies undertaking benefit-cost analyses of product safety
measures. The GM experience with respect to the defective ignition
switch is particularly noteworthy.428 If monetized assessments of
the benefits and costs of safety measures continued to play an in-
strumental role, one would expect that, for higher-stakes defect
cases, the company would undertake a comprehensive evaluation of
the merits of enhancing product safety. After the GM ignition switch
controversy emerged, GM commissioned an independent analysis
to assess the controversy.429 The detailed report that GM commis-
sioned to examine the decision-making that led to the ignition
switch defect problems did not mention any systematic attempt to
balance benefits and costs.430
The conclusion of the report was that GM appeared to have ini-
tially suppressed all such discussion by prohibiting frank assess-
ments of safety-related matters.431 Two measures undertaken by the
company are particularly telling. First, the company admonished
employees not to use particular safety-related words.432 GM officials
were counseled not to use controversial judgment words in any
+deadly+defect.-a020379898 [https://perma.cc/9USQ-EPE9].
427. Id. (quoting the paintiff attorneys in a post-trial memorandum).
428. See Plungis & Higgins, supra note 111, at 534.
429. See VALUKAS, supra note 118.
430. See generally id.
431. See Consent Order, supra note 115, Exhibit B at 38-42.
432. See id. at 39-40.
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reports or presentations.433 Some of the words were seemingly
innocuous, or certainly might be the kind of language one would
expect to see in a corporate risk analysis, such as “always,” “safety,”
“safety-related,” “bad,” “critical,” “flawed,” “dangerous,” “defect,” “de-
fective,” “failed,” “failure,” “never,” “problem,” “serious,” and “un-
stable.”434 Other words might be more inflammatory.435 One wonders
if some of the examples of “judgment words” had been used in in-
ternal discussions or documents: “Corvair-like,” “decapitating,” “dis-
emboweling,” “genocide,” “ghastly,” “grisly,” “Kervorkianesque,”
“powder keg,” “rolling sarcophagus (tomb or coffin),” “suicidal,” “Ti-
tanic,” “you’re toast.”436 Second, a GM memo instructed employees
who drove GM vehicles to avoid potentially harmful characteriza-
tions of any problems they encountered, such as statements such as:
“Dangerous ... almost caused accident”; “This is a lawsuit waiting to
happen”; “This is a safety and security issue”; and “This is a very
dangerous thing to happen. My family refuses to ride in the vehicle
now.”437 Perhaps as a consequence of these admonitions, GM
officials characterized the ignition switch defect as a problem of
“convenience” rather than a matter of “safety.”438
Given the controversial history of corporate risk analyses, it is not
surprising that companies on their own initiative have not adopted
the VSL as the technique for monetizing the fatalities prevented by
safer designs.439 If companies were to introduce the use of damages
values based on the VSL in their corporate risk analyses, there
might be the problem of jurors operating in hindsight and compar-
ing the identified victim’s loss with the modest cost-per-product unit
of enhancing safety.440 Rather than considering the company’s
prospective decision in which the company assesses the costs and
benefits across an entire product line, there is a tendency by jurors
to compare the incremental cost of the safety improvement with the
433. See id. at 41-42.
434. See id. at 41.
435. See id. at 40.
436. See id. at 41.
437. Id. at 39. 
438. See VALUKAS, supra note 118, at 70.
439. See, e.g., Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 588-89 (Tex. App. 1996), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998).
440. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
557-58 (2000).
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identified fatality, creating an imbalance that will be to the disad-
vantage of the company.441 That type of thinking was apparent in
the aforementioned examples of corporate risk analyses in which
the unit cost of the safety improvements that were identified in the
internal company analyses led the jurors to conclude that the com-
pany merited a substantial punitive damages award.442
As Seventh Circuit Judge Eschbach observed in a case involving
the safety of escalator design:
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that
distorts judgment. Engineers design escalators to minimize the
sum of construction, operation, and injury costs. Department
stores, which have nothing to gain from maiming their custom-
ers and employees, willingly pay for cost-effective precautions....
Come the lawsuit, however, the passenger injured by a stop
presents himself as a person, not a probability. Jurors see to-
day’s injury; persons who would be injured if buttons were hard-
er to find and use are invisible. Although witnesses may talk
about them, they are spectral figures, insubstantial compared to
the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh.443
E. Establishing a Supportive Legal Environment for Corporate
Risk Analysis
If government agencies adopted the VSL as the metric for
monetizing fatality risks in their regulatory enforcement efforts,
then they would be establishing the appropriate deterrence values
for the reduction of fatality risks.444 Doing so sends companies the
pertinent financial signal for the importance of reducing fatalities.445
When assessing the financial return from product risks, compa-
nies would consider not only potential wrongful death awards but
also the possibility of substantial regulatory sanctions.446 There
would not be the need for companies to undertake the initiative
441. See id.
442. See Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 2001); Miles, 922 S.W.2d
at 572; supra notes 414-30 and accompanying text.
443. Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1990).
444. See supra Parts II.A-B.
445. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
446. See supra Part III (discussing regulatory penalty structures).
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to introduce the VSL into their calculations, as anticipation of
appropriately established government penalty levels would achieve
that objective.447 This cost level for monetizing the fatality risks
would be pertinent whether corporations undertook formal or
informal analyses448 of the consequences of marketing unsafe
products.
The integration of the VSL into the regulatory penalty structure
would enable companies to set a price on fatalities by alluding to the
government penalty structure.449 Thus, rather than indicating that
the company was going to establish its own value on regulatory fa-
talities, the company could instead use a figure based on the maxi-
mum regulatory sanction for such outcomes.450 Positioning this
sensitive valuation as implementing guidance provided by govern-
ment regulators, rather than the company’s own valuation, may
frame the valuation task in a manner that is less likely to generate
criticism of the company’s efforts to assess the costs and benefits of
safety measures.451
Nevertheless, there could be risks that the companies might face
if they formalized their assessments of the benefits and costs of
the safety measure. If companies incorporated the value of these
monetary sanctions for fatalities in their risk analyses, the compa-
nies’ undertaking of such assessments would still be subject to the
vagaries of hindsight bias, to the extent that juries regard mone-
tization of fatality risks as evidence of corporate behavior that
serves as a trigger for a punitive damages award.452 Experimental
studies involving hundreds of mock jurors suggest that this pos-
sibility is quite real, as jurors are likely to view the VSL as a val-
uation amount that should serve as a floor for possible penalties
that juries should levy in order to convey to the company that lives
should be more highly valued.453 Using high dollar values for fatality
risks has a counterproductive effect in boosting awards, which
can be muted to some extent by conveying to jurors the important
447. Cf. supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., supra Parts IV.A-D.
449. Cf. supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
450. Cf. supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
451. See Dilworth, supra note 426 (noting the criticism faced by Chrysler for its officials’
“cold-blooded[ ]” calculations); supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
452. See Viscusi, supra note 440, at 557-58; supra notes 442-46 and accompanying text.
453. See Viscusi, supra note 440, at 557-58; Viscusi, supra note 402, at 157-58.
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role such valuations have in fostering safety in other contexts.454
Nevertheless, if there is a tendency of jurors to award punitive dam-
ages when companies undertake risk analyses that monetize
risks, and if jurors set the damages amount above whatever value
the company used in its analysis, there will be a strong disincentive
for using the VSL in explicit corporate risk analyses.455
Given the impediments that corporations face with respect to
such monetization, which may involve very large punitive damage
awards,456 it is likely that additional legal protections for such an-
alyses could play a constructive role in protecting companies from
jurors misinterpreting the function of responsible corporate risk an-
alyses. In particular, suppose that undertaking such analyses and
the content of those analyses could not be introduced as evidence in
personal injury cases. Such a legal protection is analogous to the
role of apology laws in medical malpractice contexts.457 In the thirty-
eight states that have adopted apology laws, if the physician has
apologized to the patient for a medical error or an unfavorable
treatment outcome, the plaintiff cannot introduce the apology as
evidence in the trial.458 Typical of such laws is the apology law in
Virginia, which includes the following provision: “[T]he portion of
statements, writings, affirmations, benevolent conduct, or benevo-
lent gestures expressing sympathy, commiseration, condolence, com-
passion, or a general sense of benevolence, together with apologies
that are made by a health care provider ... to the patient ... shall be
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability.”459 One could
easily formulate similar statutory protections for corporate risk an-
alyses. A less broad extension of the apology law concept for
corporate risk analyses would be to prohibit the introduction of such
evidence if the risk analysis indicated that additional safety mea-
sures were not warranted, but to permit plaintiffs to introduce the
454. See Viscusi, supra note 402, at 155-56.
455. See supra notes 442-46 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 2001); Miles v.
Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W. 572 (Tex. App. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 967 S.W.2d 377
(Tex. 1998); supra notes 403, 414, 420, 427 and accompanying text.
457. See Benjamin J. McMichael et al., “Sorry” Is Never Enough: How State Apology Laws
Fail to Reduce Medical Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
458. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (West 2018); see also McMichael et al., supra
note 457 (manuscript at 1, 11-12).
459. § 8.01-581.20:1.
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apology if the benefits of the additional safety measure did not out-
weigh the costs.
CONCLUSION
There is currently a fatal mismatch between the value that reg-
ulatory agencies place on lives when designing regulations, and the
values that they levy as sanctions for violations that lead to fa-
talities. This imbalance in turn diminishes the economic incentives
for safety that will be provided to the regulated firms. As a conse-
quence, regulatory policies are less protective than they would be if
the safety incentives were bolstered.
Unfortunately, simply recognizing the existence of a mismatch is
not sufficient to enable regulatory agencies to remedy the problem.
So long as regulatory agencies have statutory caps that establish
inordinately low upper bounds on the penalty levels that can be
assessed, it will not be feasible for agencies to set penalties at the
optimal deterrence levels. Restructuring the statutory guidelines to
permit penalties in line with the VSL will enable agencies to set
sufficiently large penalties to promote safety. This Article provided
detailed guidance on how these statutes can be revised to permit
agencies to set penalties in an effective range.
However, having the leeway to levy sufficiently large penalties
does not ensure that agencies will implement a penalty structure
at this higher level. Indeed, current penalties are often not even at
the allowable caps, which are considerably below the levels needed
to create optimal deterrence. Having appropriate penalty caps in
the revised statutory guidance can serve as a signal to regulatory
agencies regarding the magnitude of penalties that should be
appropriate. But there is also a need for agencies to better under-
stand the principles underlying the law and economic theories of
optimal deterrence, which are quite straightforward, but neverthe-
less would assist officials in understanding that the particular pen-
alty amounts are not random numbers from an arbitrary penalty
schedule, but have meaningful economic effects in establishing ap-
propriate incentives to save lives.
This overhaul of regulatory enforcement efforts in turn will
have fundamental ramifications for how firms assess the econom-
ic merits of improvements in job safety and product safety. With
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weak regulatory enforcement, the main matters of concern in sit-
uations where market influences are inadequate and regulations
are needed may be the financial costs, such as the liability costs
resulting from product-related fatalities or the workers’ compensa-
tion costs linked to job injuries. Establishing meaningful economic
sanctions for violations that result in fatalities will lead firms to
place a greater weight on improvements in product safety. If given
additional legal protections, firms may also undertake explicit
assessments of the benefits and costs of safety improvements in
their corporate risk assessments of alternative safety-related
measures. A principal dividend from bolstering the economic
incentives generated by agencies’ enforcement efforts is that
companies will also become more vigilant in promoting safety.
Adoption of a $10 million penalty cap per fatality is in line with
current economic estimates of the value of preventing an expected
death, but it may be appropriate to increase the upper limit in fu-
ture years.460 Inflation over time will tend to erode the purchasing
power associated with this penalty cap.461 Similarly, if there are con-
tinued increases in societal income levels over time, those changes
too will boost the appropriate deterrence value.462 However, such
updates are much more modest in scale than, for example, boosting
the maximum OSHA penalty for serious violations that pose fatality
risks from $12,934 to $10 million.463 The updates of the VSL for in-
flation and related changes are now addressed in the routine prac-
tices of federal agencies.464 Maintaining a penalty structure that is
in line with providing effective incentives for controlling risk will be
quite feasible once there is the appropriate restructuring of the
penalty approach to generate optimal levels of deterrence. The
critical task is to overhaul a penalty structure that was established
almost a half century ago and has undergone only minimal changes
since then for increases in the cost of living.465 Regulatory agencies
460. See generally Viscusi, supra note 9, at 436-41 tbls.7.2 & 7.3 (reviewing about 100
regulatory analyses and their associated VSL).
461. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 9, at 8-9 (describing the routine practice of
accounting for inflation in updating VSL values).
462. See W. Kip Viscusi & Clayton J. Masterman, Income Elasticities and Global Values
of a Statistical Life, 8 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 226, 227, 248 (2017).
463. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3) (2018).
464. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 9, at 8-9.
465. See, e.g., § 1903.15(d)(3).
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should rectify the current inconsistent policy approach in which pro-
spective hypothetical lives are highly valued but actual lives are not.
